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Dear friends,
It is a distinct pleasure to introduce INEQUALITY AND COMMUNICATIVE
STRUGGLES IN DIGITAL TIMES: A GLOBAL REPORT ON COMMUNICATION
FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS. Originally the “Media and Communication” chapter of the
International Panel on Social Progress, published by Cambridge University Press, we
hope this version as a CARGC Press book will expand the reach of the authors’ vision
of communication for social progress. CARGC Press is the in-house publisher at the
Center for Advanced Research in Global Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA.
This book coincides with the fifth anniversary of CARGC and CARGC Press, and articulates several core CARGC research themes, drawn directly from our mission to be
“an institute for advanced study dedicated to global media studies” where scholars “revisit enduring questions and engage pressing matters in geopolitics and communication.” These are Geopolitics of Media and Culture; Theory and History in Global Media
Studies; Communicating Radicalism, Radicalizing Communication; and Knowledge
Production and Dissemination / CARGC Press.
INEQUALITY AND COMMUNICATIVE STRUGGLES IN DIGITAL TIMES: A
GLOBAL REPORT ON COMMUNICATION FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS exemplifies
truly international colloboration, with authors hailing from the four corners of the
world, housed in several disciplines, and with different approaches to communication.
What unites us is a deeply held belief that communication strategies and practices
must be deployed in the service of global social progress, a belief that animates every
page of the book.
This book echoes CARGC’s mission to advocate for a truly inclusive field of global media and communication studies that recognizes plurality and inequality in our world,
and engages with some of the most consequential issues of our era. We are very proud
of our partnership with the International Panel on Social Progress, and hope you find
this publication useful.
All the best,

Marwan M. Kraidy
Anthony Shadid Chair in Global Media, Politics and Culture
Director, Center for Advanced Research in Global Communication
Annenberg School for Communication
Andrew Carnegie Fellow
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Summary
Developments in digital technologies over the
last thirty years have expanded massively human
beings’ capacity to communicate across time and
space (Section 1). Media infrastructures have simultaneously acquired huge complexity. By “media” we mean technologies for the production,
dissemination, and reception of communication,
but also the contents distributed through those
technologies and the institutions associated with
their production, dissemination, and reception.
The relations between media, communications,
and social progress are complex. More peo-

ple can now make meaning and be connected
through media, providing an important resource
for new movements for justice and social progress. Meanwhile the uneven distribution of opportunities to access and use media is itself a dimension of social justice.
Media infrastructures, and media access, have
spread unevenly (Section 2), and media’s consequences for social progress cannot be determined at a general level. Traditional and digital
media have developed according to distinctive
histories across the world (2.1), with varying
marketization and state control (case studies on
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would have been impossible!); Guy Berger of UNESCO and Anita Gurumurthy of ITforChange for their excellent
comments on an earlier draft, as well as all those who contributed through IPSP’s public comments process; and Emma
Christina Montaña for her excellent work on the Spanish translation of the chapter.
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China, Russia, Sweden, South Africa, Indonesia,
and Mexico: 2.2). Inequalities of access to media
infrastructures (2.3) are stark, between and within regions and inside countries, with implications
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Cultural flows through media vary greatly within
and between regions (2.4).
Meanwhile (2.5) people’s increasing dependence
on an online infrastructure that mediates daily
life increases the importance of the corporations,
which provide that infrastructure. This has transformed the governance of media infrastructures
(Section 3), with a shift from formal to informal governance and the growing importance of
transnational governance institutions and practices, whereby corporations, not states, exercise
predominant influence (3.2), including through
the operations of algorithms, with ambiguous
implications for corporate power and individual
rights, for the public sphere and for social progress (3.3).
Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for disseminating public knowledge,
and so contributing to social progress (Section
4). While digital technologies have expanded
who can do journalism (see 4.5 on citizens’ media), other aspects of digitization have undermined the economics of public journalism (4.3),
with new threats to journalists from growing
political instability (4.4). Even so, there are new
voices within global journalism (4.6 on TeleSUR
and Al-Jazeera).
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The increasing networking of communications
changes citizenship too, as citizens find information, develop imaginative loyalties and make
practical connections beyond national borders,
not only within the Global North (Section 5)
and with particular implications for global youth
(5.2). A more “connected” life is however not

simply “better” (see 5.3’s case study of life in a
Chinese heritage village and 5.4 on the media-based oppression and resistance of precarious workers in East Asia).
Struggles for social justice through the democratization of media (Section 6) have acquired
new prominence, echoing previous struggles
(6.1) and foregrounding the transparency and
accountability of media infrastructures, and data
flows in particular, (6.2), with implications for
the SDGs and Social Progress Index (SPI). Concerns include net neutrality, Internet freedom,
algorithms’ discriminatory operations, and the
automated surveillance on which most online
businesses now rely. There are implications for
state and corporate power (6.5) which civil society has challenged (6.4 on India and Facebook’s
Free Basics). A bold new model of Internet governance has emerged in Brazil (6.6 on Marco
Civil).
Yet media remain the channel through which
many struggles for social progress are pursued
(Section 7). An important example of innovative
media use for social progress was the Zapatistas in Mexico (7.1), but social movements’ uses
of media technologies have taken many forms
across the world, exposing important constraints
(7.2). Since old media generally do not disappear
but are linked up in new ways through digital
media, it is overall ecologies of media resource
on which movements that struggle for social
progress have drawn (7.3), with struggles against
the injustices faced by disabled people being an
example of the creative use of media resources
(7.4).
Effective access to media is a necessary component of social justice (Section 8). But media’s
consequences for social progress are complicated
by uneven media access, the plurality of spaces

where people connect through media, and the
multiple uses of communication resources (hate
speech is enabled by the Internet too). The SPI
should measure the distribution of opportunities
for effective media access and use, and address
communication rights. Media infrastructures

are a common good whose governance should
be open to democratic participation. Concerns
about automated surveillance and the environmental costs of digital waste must also be addressed. Our action plan and toolkit list various
measures to these ends.

1. Introduction: media infrastructures and communication flows
Media’s role in social change, and potentially social progress, is often assumed, rather than fully
investigated. “Media” are inherently complex, in
themselves and in their consequences. By “media” we mean primarily technologies for the production, dissemination and reception of communications, but (in accordance with the common
usage of the word “media” and its equivalents in
many languages) we include also contents distributed through those technologies and the institutions associated with their production, dissemination, and reception. By “social progress,”
we refer to the development of societies towards
the progressive enablement of human beings to
fulfil their needs and capabilities (Sen 1999; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009; compare the Social
Progress Index [Porter and Stern 2015], especially “Access to information and communication”).
The consequences of media for social progress
can be approached from many angles. Our main
emphasis will be on media as providers of content and infrastructures of connection, since
these are media’s most important aspects for social progress.

1.1 Media as infrastructures of connection
Developments in media technologies over the
past three decades have expanded massively the
capacity of human beings and automated systems

to create, use, disseminate, and store information
and content of all types across time and space.
This has happened through the emergence of the
Internet, the digitization of previously analogue
content, and the development of new platforms
and devices. Changes have come so fast that it is
easy to forget the much longer history of media’s
role in the formation of modern societies, polities, and economies. In this chapter we seek to
recognize that longer history, while also reflecting upon the dramatic nature of media’s transformations over the past three decades.
Media inherently involve the production, sharing and interpretation of meanings, and so media processes are always contestable and open
to further interpretation. Yet media remain at
the same time infrastructure: networks of interdependencies that enable social, political, and
economic action, but also encode both cultural
and technological constraints. This double role
of media, as both meaning and infrastructure
(Sewell 2005; Boczkowski and Siles 2014), requires investigating both media cultures – what
users and audiences do with the media, their
“media-related practices” (Couldry 2012) – and
media affordances: how media infrastructures
shape the range of possible uses available to everyday users and audiences.
3

1.2 Media as enablers of increasing cultural
complexity
Media infrastructures have acquired a particular
complexity and reach in the past three decades
due to the global but uneven spread of the Internet and social media platforms. Globalization
has distributed flows of meaning more transnationally than before. Mundane exposure to media images and messages that flow from other
parts of the world encourages people to become
more reflexively open to the meanings produced
in other places. This has generated unprecedented cross-border connection, dialogue, and solidarity.
However the basic patterns underlying contemporary media flows have much earlier origins.
From the birth of the press through the development of postal, telephone, radio, and television networks, media flows and infrastructures
have been crucial to successive modern forms
of citizenship, providing information about
governments and markets, connecting national
populations and economies, providing forums
for citizen practice and underpinning national
identity (Anderson 1983). Media flows and infrastructures have also played central roles in
projects of political and economic domination,
providing the information necessary to govern
empires, manage enterprises, and control populations. But media’s spread across the world has
been uneven, as Section 2 explains.
Despite increasing convergence of platforms for
media delivery, proliferating media flows and
infrastructures have produced cultural complexity and increased the possibilities for cultural
contestation, within and across national borders (Hannerz 1992; Iwabuchi 2002). Imagined
4
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The SPI report is found in Porter and Stern 2015.

communities, sustained by media, now proliferate involving for example marginalized people,
diasporic communities, and political activists.
Digital media have also enabled more people to
become active producers and disseminators of
images and meanings. This expanded productivity of meaning through media has itself become
a practical precondition for new movements for
social progress.

1.3 The social justice issues raised by media
and communications
Through media, individuals and groups have
more cultural resources with which to interpret
and challenge cultural forms. Such access enriches the modalities of political action and protest,
with consequences for social change and social
progress (relevant SPI indicators are “Personal rights” and “Personal freedom and choice”).5
The political struggles against slavery in the
nineteenth century and for the civil rights of all
ethnic groups in the late twentieth century were
also cultural struggles that drew on contemporary media resources. But because media impact is always contestable, the consequences of
media practice and media innovations for social
progress cannot be determined at a general level.
Media globalization has both engendered indifference and disparity of attention and promoted
dialogue and solidarity. Media and communications’ contribution to social progress must always be considered at more specific levels.
Nonetheless, since connection is important to
people’s possibilities of action, the uneven distribution of opportunities to access media and use
them effectively is a dimension of social justice in
its own right. Improved “access to information

and communications technology,” including
“universal affordable access to the Internet” by
2020, is rightly a Sustainable Development Goal
(SDG 9.c),6 but it raises fundamental social justice issues too. First, media are a key resource
that enables the “reality” of particular social and
political territories to be framed one way rather
than another; as a result, media, through their
operations, can perpetrate specific “injustices
[in] framing” (Fraser 2005: 79) the social world.
Second, because media have the symbolic power
to construct general realities, media institutions
comprise a resource whose long-term distribution can be unjust. Some battles for social progress contest particular media representations;
others challenge media institutions’ general
control over symbolic power. In still other cases,
media provide a forum for challenging injustices
unconnected with media.
The relations between media, communications,
and social progress are therefore inherently
complex. Measures of social progress (such as
the SPI) require considerable adjustment if they
are to fully take account of media’s contribution
to social progress: measures of technological access alone are insufficient. Nor (see Section 2) is
there a common pattern to how media institutions “work” in societies across the world. Even
so, media and communications have important
potential to contribute to particular struggles for
social justice.

6
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The SDGs are found in United Nations 2015.
For a reassessment, see Vincent and Nordenstreng (2015).

1.4 Media, communications and the longer
global struggle for media reform
Now is not the first time that the implications of
media flows and infrastructures for social progress have been considered on a global scale. Such
questions were central to the MacBride Report
prepared for UNESCO in 1980 (Many Voices,
One World), which followed two decades of contested debate about “development”. The report
proposed a New World Information and Communication Order (“NWICO”) and challenged
the assumption that a global media infrastructure
dominated by “the West” was good for democracy, social order and human rights. But the MacBride Report’s proposals were not implemented,
and a recent attempt to revive their broad agenda
(the World Summit on the Information Society
in 2003) has also achieved only limited success.7
The history of “media reform” on a global scale is
an interrupted one (MacBride and Roach 1989),
which we discuss more fully in Section 6. Meanwhile, the relations between media and capitalist
accumulation (Schiller 1999; Jin 2015) become
ever more complex, and new market-based media infrastructures – for example, social media
platforms and the vast infrastructures of data extraction on which they rely – pose increasingly
urgent questions for social life and democratic
practice.

5

2. Media industries from print to the Internet
This section introduces the diversity and unevenness of media infrastructures, media access, and
media’s cultural dynamics across the world. As
such, it provides the reference point for later discussions of contemporary forms of communication inequality and opportunities for, or threats
to, public knowledge (Sections 3 and 4) and the
emergence of new spaces for citizenship (Section
5) and the long history of struggles for “democratization of media” and “democratization through
media” (Zhao and Hackett 2005) (Sections 6 and
7).

2.1 Traditional media and the Internet as
infrastructures of connection
Policy discourses about media have been dominated by the histories of how “modern” media
(newspapers, radio, television, film) developed
in Western Europe and North America. While
scholarship on the complex regional flows of
media has challenged the dominance of Western
history (Schiller 1969; Boyd-Barrett 1977; Iwabuchi 2007; Sinclair and Jacka 1996), the same
geographical skewing has been repeated in recent accounts of the rise of the Internet (Chan
2013). We will argue against this simplified view.
No universal history of media is possible on a
global scale. Today’s uneven global media landscape reflects many diverse histories: the contrasting reliance on public service versus commercial models of broadcasting in European
and North American media systems; major linguistic and institutional diversity in Australasia
and the Pacific; the contrasting roles played by
state and market in India versus China; the su6
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per-fast growth of online connectivity in NorthEast Asian economies dominated by Chaebols
(family-owned multinationals in South Korea);
the contrasting legacies of colonialism in media
development in Africa and Latin America; the
distinctive role played by Gulf petro-monarchies
in the Arab region’s media. There are many possible relations between media, state, market, and
society, each shaped differently by geopolitical
forces, which rule out a universal narrative of
“media and 10 social progress”. In what follows
we present case studies from different regions to
underscore not only media’s diversity at a national level, but also how variously media and
communication systems intersect to generate resources for social progress. Further case studies
are added in later Sections (4 and 6).

2.2 Case Studies
Country case study one: China/Russia8
Today, Russia and China have large media systems which are highly distinctive in that, while
incorporating various market features, they
trace their historical origins to twentieth century state-controlled noncommercial media systems, whose organization had intellectual roots
in Marxist-Leninist critiques of capitalist and
imperialist control of the media in the West. As
such, both systems share the legacy of today’s
“social movement media,” but are also internally
complex and marked by nationalistic and sectorial struggles. Indeed, the Chinese system had
distinctive differences from the Soviet model and
by the early 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese media systems were in serious ideological conflict.

Material on Russia in this case study written by Olessia Koltsova.

By the late 1960s, the Chinese media system was
destabilized in the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, what these historical systems
had in common was their communist visions of
achieving social progress through ideological
mobilization and cultural enfranchisement. This
vision provided many Third World postcolonial
states with alternative models for media organization from those in the West while also providing inspiration for social struggles in the West,
including U.S. civil rights struggles (Dudziak
2000; Frazier 2015). However, bureaucratic ossification, and other forms of political, social, and
cultural repression, as well as the influence of
Western media, contributed to the transformations of China’s and Russia’s media systems from
the early 1980s.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with
a television-centered noncommercial media system. Liberalization, fractionalization of the postcommunist political elite, and economic difficulties led to privatization of state TV channels in
the mid-1990s. Newly founded private television
channels emerged as the economic situation improved, bringing more diversity into the media
landscape. However, the early years of the twenty-first century have seen a gradual renationalization of most leading TV channels, outside the
entertainment sector. The Russian government
inherited from its Soviet predecessor direct control over transmission networks and appointment of the top television management. While
the 1990s saw media wars between different television channels representing various political
groups, the 2000s were marked by emergence
of an identical pro-Kremlin picture on most
TV channels. Social and media development is,
however, very uneven across Russian provinces, varying from near subsistence farmers (with
access to just 2-3 analogue TV channels and no
Internet) to highly networked and cosmopolitan

major cities. The government’s television-based
policy of media control is more effective in poorer, less connected regions. While the authorities
have allowed a few oppositional media outlets
(TV Dojd’ [Rain] on the Internet; RBC [RosBusinessConsulting] on cable and satellite; Ekho
Moskvy [Echo of Moscow] on the radio), they
have very little influence on public opinion. On
a global scale, given the denial for two decades
to Russian television of broadcasting frequencies
in most post-Soviet countries, the government
launched Russia Today as a news provider, which
is rapidly emerging as a major transnational satellite channel.
Against the trend of most other Russian industries, the Russian Internet industry has been very
successful. Russia is the only country where local Internet businesses have beaten global giants
without any protective barriers, with Yandex
search engine more popular in Russia than Google, while Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki social
networking sites are attracting much larger local
audiences than Facebook. Nevertheless, the Russian government is facing a challenging choice
with regard to Internet management. It has been
eager to make the Internet a “locomotive” for
the rest of the Russian economy, but this risk
weakens disrupting the vision promoted by the
government’s continued control of Russian television, since government control of the Internet
is weaker. Attempts to increase Internet control
through progovernment ownership of Russian
social media sites such as LiveJournal and VKontakte might drive a key segment of the news
reading Internet audience to foreign competitors
such as Facebook. The Russian government has
developed three main tactics: gaining ownership
over online media; producing its own “user generated content”; and blocking websites. The result has been a dramatic polarization of Russian
audiences between a loyal majority and a criti-
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cal minority both online and offline. This policy
coupled with state support of Internet-based creativity, has encouraged the Russian IT sector to
move away from politically sensitive issues.
China’s post-1980 media system has developed
very differently from the Russian system. China’s media system retains its overall Leninist
structure and core organizational principles, yet
through post-Mao China’s economic growth and
rapid industrial expansion, China’s print and
broadcasting media industries are both larger
and more highly developed, and more tightly
integrated and centrally controlled than Russia’s.
By mid-2015, China had over 2,000 newspaper
titles, nearly 10,000 periodicals, more than 300
television stations with nearly 3,000 channels,
with an audience reach of 1.35 billion. However,
following nearly four decades of state-directed
commercialization, market consolidation, global integration, and digital convergence, China’s
media also bear the hallmarks of market-driven
systems familiar in other parts of the world.

8

At the core of China’s media and communications infrastructure are state-controlled media
and communications conglomerations organized
at national and provincial levels, including Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily Group, CCTV,
China National Radio and China Radio International, and state-owned telecommunication
providers such as China Mobile, China Telecom,
and China Unicom. Regional media conglomerates such as Shanghai Media and Entertainment
Group, Guangdong Nanfang Media Group, and
Hunan Satellite Television have also been highly
influential in spearheading institutional reform,
operational innovations, and content diversification. While state control, political direction, and
censorship remain an enduring issue for China’s
media professional strata and citizens, particularly in relation to social media platforms, some

outlets such as CCTV’s well-known prime time
investigative show Focus Interviews have played
a significant role in spearheading social reforms.
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese state has systematically aimed to build the size and strength
of its media and communication operations.
Targeted national initiatives such as the “connecting every village” project have significantly
improved access in China’s remote areas, making China’s media and communication infrastructure one of the most advanced in the Global
South. At the same time, as part of the Chinese
state’s effort to address long-standing imbalances
in global communication and promote its own
vision of “globalization,” it has systematically expanded the reach of its media and communication industries, with CCTV establishing branches in North America and Africa, and China
Telecom and China Mobile expanding globally.
The Chinese state’s persistent effort to control the
“commanding heights” of converging media and
communication industries, regulate global media and communication flows, manage private
and foreign capital investments, and pursue the
latest technological innovations, has had a huge
impact on the system’s evolving structure and
values (Hong 2017).
China’s framework for developing its media
and communications infrastructure does not
therefore fit with the dominant Western liberal
framework that treats press freedom (and “Internet freedom”), defined always as freedom from
government control, as the precondition of social progress. Each framework is explained by
its distinctive historical and geopolitical context:
accordingly, the more the Chinese media system
evolves, the more the Communist Party of China
seeks to emphasize its Leninist founding principles.

Since the early 1990s, the Chinese state has
mounted an all-out effort for information technology development through various “golden
projects” to integrate network applications with
Chinese politics, economy, and society. In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, the
Chinese state elevated the media, communication, Internet, and cultural industries as a driver
of economic restructuring (Hong 2017). In early
2015, Premier Li Keqiang unveiled the Chinese
state’s “Internet Plus Action Plan” to stimulate
economic growth by integrating mobile Internet,
cloud computing, big data and the “Internet of
things” with modern manufacturing. No other
issue has received as much strategic emphasis by
consecutive Chinese leaderships in the past three
decades. By the time China-based Internet firm
Alibaba made a record-setting stock market debut in New York in 2014, China had established
itself as the world’s largest Internet market in
terms of the number of users, and in December
2015 China’s Internet population was 688 million – just over half of the national population
(China Internet Network Information Center
2016). Yet in this project of making China into “a
cyber power,” the Chinese state treats citizen access and government control as not opposed, but
indissolubly linked (Xinhua 2014). Meanwhile,
various sectors of Chinese society have enthusiastically embraced the Internet (as less tightly
controlled than the traditional media), turning
it into a new terrain of discursive struggles over
China’s future.
These developments challenge any simplistic
“state versus civil society” reading of how the
Internet contributes to social progress: both the
Chinese state and Chinese society have been empowered through the Internet (Zhang and Zheng
2012), with outcomes significantly different from
the parallel history of media in Russia.

Country case study two: Sweden
In contrast to government-controlled media
regimes, Sweden’s media is shaped by a welfare
state system and characterized by a distinctive relation between media and state, market and civil
society. Traditionally, Sweden has had high voter
turnout, and high levels of media and information literacy, not least due to the national subsidy
system for print newspapers, which have resulted in a plurality of local newspapers with high
readership. Typically, the subsidy system provided for a plurality of political positions, with
at least two local or regional newspapers representing two political viewpoints. Like other European countries, Sweden has had a strong public service broadcaster for radio and TV, which
since the late 1980s has faced strong competition
from commercial broadcasters. The communications infrastructure has been well developed,
with high penetrations of landline phones, mobile phones, and computers.
The development of Sweden’s news media has
followed a similar pattern as other north European countries, with weakening public service media (due to audiences migrating to commercial
channels), and a drift within the press from a focus on opinion formation to a closer tracking of
market demand (Weibull 2016). Newspapers are
today facing dramatic declines in readership, and
advertising has migrated to the Internet. News
consumption has also migrated from traditional
press to social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This shift has challenged Sweden’s distinctive
relations between media and wider society.
Since the late 1990s Sweden has witnessed a tight
horizontal integration of the media sector, with
companies formerly working within one media developing tie-ins or purchasing companies
in other markets: Sweden’s largest media house

9

Bonnier, a book publisher in the nineteenth century, moved early into publishing newspapers
and weekly/monthly magazines, and today owns
television, cinemas, advertising, and social marketing outlets. The development of “media houses,” with particular regions’ media being largely
controlled by local or regional media houses, has
also undermined the press subsidy system, undermining political variety in spite of continued
state subsidy (Nygren and Zuiderveld 2011).

commercial, and community media. South Africa became a democracy in 1994, with its early
period postindependence from Britain (1961)
better seen as the continuation of colonialism
in internal form (the apartheid system) (Visser
1997). But in many ways the country’s media
show similarities with those elsewhere on the
continent, where colonialism, the postcolonial
transition, and globalization have shaped media
systems.

The digitization of media contents in particular
has changed the power dynamics within the media industries, with the telecommunications industries acquiring increased importance because
of their centrality to Wi-Fi and broadband networks. This infrastructural power was highlighted in 2016, when TeliaSonera closed an exclusive deal with Facebook for free surfing through
their networks, perceived as unfair competition
by Swedish news publishers in print and broadcasting and contrary to the EU regulation on net
neutrality (compare Section 6.4 on Facebook India).9

The changes that South African public broadcasting has undergone illustrate some of these
shifts. As in other African countries under military or one-party state rule, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) under
apartheid acted as a state broadcaster. In 1991,
the Windhoek Declaration, which was put together by independent African journalists and
endorsed by UNESCO, initiated a move to greater freedom, pluralism, and independence as regards print media. This was followed ten years
later by the African Charter on Broadcasting
which created momentum for private, public,
and community broadcasting. The Windhoek
Declaration signalled a move towards greater independence of broadcasting continentwide, even
if in some countries like Zimbabwe there has
been a deterioration in recent years (Kupe 2016).
The Windhoek Declaration coincided with the
period of negotiated transition in South Africa,
which saw the SABC adopting a public service
mandate and media freedom entrenched in the
new Constitution. The SABC has however never
been fully publicly funded, and is largely dependent on commercial funding (Kupe 2014:29). As
in other African countries, the SABC has recently seen a “push-back” from government (Kupe
2016): some argue its editorial independence has

Because of its well-developed infrastructure for
high-speed Internet, Sweden is also known as a
safe-haven for Internet piracy, with The Pirate
Bay party – its most prominent symbol (Larsson
2013; Andersson Schwarz 2013) – acting as a focus for debates on media governance issues.
Country case study three: South Africa
South African media are arguably the most technologically advanced on the African continent,
offering a wide range of content across print,
broadcast, and digital platforms. Its media landscape involves a three-tiered model of public,
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eroded under pressure from an ANC government increasingly intolerant of media criticism.
Other negative signs have been the proposal of a
statutory Media Appeals Tribunal which would
impose harsher sanctions on offending journalists and the Protection of State Information Bill
which could criminalize whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and civil society activists who
access information classified by government as
secret (R2K 2015).
South Africa led the way in newspaper development in Anglophone Africa, with the publication of the Cape Town Gazette in 1800 (Karikari
2007:13), and a centuries-old private commercial
press. Under apartheid, mainstream newspapers
either supported the regime (the Afrikaans-language press) or provided a limited critique (the
English press), while an alternative, underground press engaged in a more radical critique
of apartheid and faced harassment, censure, and
closures. Democratization largely eliminated the
parallelism between language and political orientation, and most South African newspapers
adopted a watchdog approach to the government
and reflected a liberal, commercial consensus.
Meanwhile, South African media have been affected by global investment processes. The South
African press was a major capitalist venture from
its inception. For example, the South African
media company Naspers has become a globalized conglomerate, while the Irish Independent group bought the largest English-language
newspaper group in 1994, selling it in 2013 to the
Sekunjalo consortium, in which Chinese business interests have a major stake. Widely seen as
a vehicle for soft power in Africa, several stateowned Chinese media houses have offices on the
continent (Kenya as well as South Africa), including the news agency Xinhua, the newspaper
China Daily, China Central Television, and Chi-

na Radio International. China has also funded
Africa’s media and communications infrastructure (Wu 2012). The influence of the Chinese
media presence and investments in African media on journalistic norms and practices has been
controversial, and challenges any simple regional
or Western-dominated model of media diversity.
During the transition to democracy, a particular attempt was made to strengthen the community media sector through the establishment of
the Media Development and Diversity Agency
(MDDA) to fund media owned and controlled
by the community they serve, especially to enable more Black ownership of media (Banda
2006). Another important development has
been the rise of popular tabloid newspapers
which, although commercially owned, provide
perspectives from the poor, mostly Black, working class rarely found in mainstream print media
(Wasserman 2010). Some of the most interesting
alternatives to the mainstream print media in
South Africa have been online (the Daily Maverick, The Con and Groundup). Such publications
have provided critical analysis and investigative
reporting often surpassing the mainstream press
in South Africa in diversity and depth. Despite
the obstacles in terms of access and reach, digital media platforms are increasingly reshaping
social relationships and public spheres in Africa
(Mabweazara 2015: 2). Meanwhile, the mobile
phone has had a massive impact as a platform
for Internet access, for reconstituting traditional
modes of sociality (Mabweazara 2015: 2-3), and,
via social media platforms, providing spaces for
citizens to engage in political debate and mobilize for social change.
Country case study four: Indonesia10
An important case of a diverse media system is
Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia
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with a population of 240 million, and the fourth
largest democracy in the world. The establishment of Indonesia’s modern media system owes
greatly to the legacies of President Soeharto’s
five-year economic development plans, which
centralized capital and inhabitants in Java. For
decades the authoritarian state held strong control over media infrastructure and content, from
the press, radio, film, satellite, to television. The
media system was built to support state developmentalism, limiting civilians to accessing information provided by the state.
During the 1960s-1980s, Indonesia had a single, state broadcasting system, Television of the
Republic of Indonesia. Although designed as a
network system, television infrastructure and
production relied heavily on central funding and
programming (Sen and Hill 2000). The state-controlled television system shifted to an open, privatized, and more liberal system in the late 1980s
as a consequence of the government’s open market and open sky policy. These policies allowed
foreign content via satellite television and cable
networks (Hollander et al. 2009), which catered
to the needs of the expanding urban middle
class. By the early 1990s, dozens of private television stations had been founded, owned by the
President’s close allies. This gave precedence
to market demand over commercial news, and
gradually weakened state control over information. Around the same time, the Internet came
to Indonesia, providing an alternative source of
information to a small elite in Java (Sen and Hill
2000; Lim 2003). Media liberalization and commercialization of information paved way for the
growth of a civil society (Hollander et al. 2009;
Hill and Sen 2005), which was the prelude to Indonesia’s transition towards democracy.
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The authoritarian regime finally broke under the
weight of the Asian economic crisis of 1997, in
the face of increasing public pressure and conflicting interests within the ruling elite, starting
a social transformation among an expanding
middle class amid conditions of unprecedented
economic growth (Basri 2012). While market
demand over commercial news had helped the
push for democratic transition, since the early 2000s the development of the news media in
Indonesia have relied more on market responses
rather than having an independent democratic
agenda (see Lim 2011). Television is Indonesia’s
most popular media with a penetration rate of
97% (Nielsen 2014), and it continues to attract
the dominant share of advertising income.
Second to television, the Internet has the highest penetration rate of 34.9% in 2014 (APJII
2015) or 88 million users to 51.8% in 2016 (APJII 2016). Nielsen (2011) estimated that 48% of
mobile phone owners use their phones to access
the Internet. This has caused the closing of print
versions of newspapers, while digital news has
seen a steady rise. Over two decades, Indonesia’s
media have seen a convergence whereby established media companies, initially specialized in
one form of media – print, television, or online –
are expanding into other media, forming larger,
multiplatform converged conglomerates (Tapsell
2015). Indonesia experienced the largest number of mergers and acquisitions in the history of
its media system in 2011 (Nugroho et al. 2012),
establishing four large media conglomerates,
namely MNC Group, Jawa Pos Group, Kompas Gramedia Group, and Mahaka Group (Lim
2012). There has emerged a set of interconnected relationships between politicians and media
proprietors, with various political leaders owning media companies. The CEO of MNC Group,

Hary Tanoesoedibjo, founded and heads the political party Perindo, and ran for vice president
of Indonesia in 2015. MNC Group owns three
terrestrial television stations, one pay television
station with 60% of market share, 14 local television stations, one newspaper, one online news
portal, and several franchise magazines. This has
allowed media conglomerates to republish the
same news content on multiple platforms.
Significantly, the Internet infrastructure and service provision remain dominated by state enterprises Telkom and Indosat, which caters mostly
to urban users in large cities. Media markets and
conglomeration are concentrated in Jakarta and
Java more broadly, monetizing the activities of
Internet users in large cities while excluding users in rural areas and small cities. Only 20% of
women in Indonesia have Internet access (World
Wide Web Foundation 2016), which calls for
new ways for inclusive approaches that are gender-informed (see Triastuti 2014). International
forces are important too: in 2015, 70% of digital advertising revenue in Indonesia (USD 560
million) went directly to Google and Facebook,
rather than national companies. Consequently,
media systems in Indonesia today still reflect the
centralization model that was established since
the 1960s, while also registering the power of
global digital platforms.
Country case study five: Mexico11
The media system in Mexico is highly concentrated and deeply marketized. Its core is commercial broadcasting, owned by private corporations controlled by a handful of individuals.
The power of those media corporations was
built from alliances between powerful economic groups aligned with government interests that
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have benefited from discretionary grants, television and radio concessions, lucrative contracts
for governmental advertising in print media, and
ad hoc legislation (or lack of it) in favor of the
sector’s economic interests.
After the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) the
country adopted a capitalist economic model and
initiated a corporatization of the Mexican State.
From 1929 to 2000 all presidents were members
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).
Lack of regulation and communication policies
led to a concentration of media in a few families.
In the early twentieth century, well-established
industrial families (railways, mining, and banking) invested in radio broadcasting. After WWI,
U.S. capital replaced European investments in
Mexico, with large investments in the radio industry (radio stations, manufacture and sales
of radio devices, records, phonographs). Today
there are 1,600 radio stations, but 80% of them
are owned by thirteen commercial families.
In 1950 the Mexican television industry started,
modeled on the U.S. commercial system. The
families who owned radio stations became, in
turn, the owners of television stations, for example, the Azcárraga family which, from its original
concession of Channel 2, grew through mergers
to create the now better-known Televisa (Televisión Vía Satélite). From 1972 to 1993 Televisa
was Mexico’s only private television company,
competing with three public television channels.
From its origins, Televisa had a close link with
the ruling party PRI. Televisa subsequently became the most influential global producer and
distributer of Spanish-language audiovisual contents, and currently owns free-to-air television
channels, restricted television systems (satellite
and cable), a leading Spanish editorial house,
13

radio stations, entertainment companies, soccer teams and stadiums, music recording companies, and cinema distribution companies. In
the early 1990s the public television channels 7
and 13 were privatized. The Salinas Pliego family
(owners of departmental stores and previously
radio manufacturers) bought both channels and
created Televisión Azteca offering contents similar to those of Televisa and aligning itself with
the government.
The early 1990s also saw the privatization of telecommunications, generating another monopoly
(Telmex-Telcel) in the hands of just one individual, Carlos Slim. Slim’s monopoly started with
landline telephone services (Telmex has 65% of
the national market) and moved on to mobile telephony (Telcel has 65% of subscribers) and Internet services (75% of subscribers). The government justified the sale of the nation’s telephone
company to a single owner by arguing that a
monopoly would scale economies, lower costs,
and increase the number of landlines. However,
Mexico’s mobile phone and Internet service costs
are actually in the middle of international rankings (International Telecommunications Union
2014), and, although, since the early 2000s, Internet home users have grown from 5% to 61% of
the population, the digital divide between urban
and rural areas has widened.
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Political reforms have continuously supported
deregulation and privatization, and changes in
legislation have meant more power and influence
for media monopolies, generating a mediacracy,
where members of senate and congress have direct links with the media industry. In 2012 the
PRI party regained the presidency of Mexico,
with Enrique Peña Nieto elected with the full
support of the media industry, mainly Televisa.
In 2013 Peña Nieto promoted a historic constitutional reform in telecommunications and broad-

casting with the aim to increase competition in
the sector. The new legislation enabled Televisa
to enter the telecommunications market by offering triple play services (cable television, landline telephone services, and Internet). Televisa
now controls the market of restricted television
(cable and satellite) with 60% of subscribers and
in 2014 and 2015 purchased two new cable companies. The new legislation punishes Telmex by
imposing strict restrictions on telephone carriers
(cancellation of long distance fees; a prohibition
on charging for interconnection services).
There are also positive aspects to this new legislation. While public services are still offered by
private entities through concessions regimes that
distinguish between commercial, public, and social media (indigenous and cultural), with the
latter not allowed to sell advertisements (previously community and indigenous media were
not recognized, and so operated outside any legal framework), telecommunications and broadcasting have now been defined as fundamental
human rights and public services (compare SDG
9.c). As for telecommunications, the new legislation reserves a portion of the spectrum for
social concessions, reflecting the work done by
the community cellular network in creating a
network of mobile phone services for indigenous
communities previously denied mobile phone
services by the major telecommunication companies. Civil society activism in Mexico has begun slowly to correct for some of the excesses of
previous marketization.
*

*

*

*

*

The section has introduced the diversity of the
world’s media systems and their organization:
state, market, and civil society may work in isolation or together in multiple combinations, with
varying consequences for how media and com-

munications outputs provide a context for social
progress and struggles for social justice.

2.3 Unevenness of access
The stark differences in access to media between
population sectors may have consequences for
social progress. It is significant that basic levels
of mobile phone subscriptions and Internet access are included as items in the SPI, alongside
concerns about state control of media registered
in the press freedom index (compare SDG 9.c).
Effective media access depends on the interrelationship between media and other closely related
factors: literacy, language, and education (SDG
4). This is the central lesson from the “digital
divide” debate: that simple availability of technology is not sufficient for development or social progress. Empowerment of people through
Media and Information Literacy is an important
prerequisite for fostering equitable access to information and knowledge and promoting free,
independent and pluralistic media and information systems (UNESCO 2013). Adequate levels of
media use require training and education, democratic participation, accessibility of formats and
technology for people with disabilities and other
distinctive needs, diverse content in appropriate
languages, freedom of expression, and opportunities for community and citizen-produced media. The 2005 Tunis Agenda for The Information
Society acknowledged these factors, and they
have since been the focus of international efforts
(WSIS 2005). The multifaceted nature of “access”
is crucial to understanding media’s integral role
in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals,
and broader social progress (International Telecommunications Union 2016) (SPI “Access to information and communications”).

Globally, there has been progress on access to
Internet and mobile phones in the past twenty
years (SPI “Access to information and communications”; “Mobile telephone subscriptions”).
However, what such broad indicators of “access” mean on-the-ground is poorly understood:
much depends on what kinds of media, Internet,
and mobile content people can affordably access.
What media access do people need as the minimum for a “universal” service? Without closer
attention to these questions, today’s push to ever-greater digital connectivity only risks deepening digital exclusion.
There are regions with highly uneven media access. Asia, for instance, includes countries such
as South Korea and Japan, both pioneers in digital media, as well as emerging powerhouses (India, China). India has gone from fewer than 1%
of individuals using the Internet (in 2000-2001)
to 18 % in 2014; China has moved from 1.78 % in
2000 to 49.3% in 2014. Yet other Asian countries
have poor media infrastructure, including Bangladesh (9.6 % Internet users) and Laos (14.26
%) (International Telecommunications Union
2015). In Latin America, the mobile phone landscape is not homogenous, but the rapid spread of
mobile phones is in part explained by the previous lack of landlines. In a number of countries,
total figures for mobile phone subscriptions are
high – for instance, Chile, Argentina, and México (International Telecommunications Union
2016). However, on closer inspection, there is a
significant proportion of the population in these
and other countries without adequate access to
mobile communication – either through not
owning a phone or through restricted use of services due to affordability (Donner 2015).
Within countries, there are also striking disparities in access (SDG 9.c), especially in rural and
remote areas, among different sociodemograph-

15

ics, cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, and groups
with reduced or uncertain legal or citizenship
status (for example migrants and internally displaced persons). Upon closer inspection, many
cities with apparent “good infrastructure” display great differences between the media “haveless” and “have-mores”. Yet other countries have
seen extraordinary large-scale growth. Among
China’s 688 million Internet users (2015), the
vast majority (620 million) use social media applications such as Weibo and Tencent’s Wechat;
around 90% of China’s Internet-using population access the Internet through mobile phones,
while Internet use for online payments, access to
online education and medical services, has become widespread among the middle classes.
We must however note the continuing lack of
gender equity in access to and use of media.
Significantly fewer women are connected to
the Internet than men. In twenty-four of twenty-nine European countries between 2008 and
2010, men outnumbered women users of Internet. For the same time period in non-European
countries, men outnumbered women users in
thirty-six of thirty-nine countries (comprising
OECD and non-OECD countries). The “global
Internet user gender gap” widened from 11% in
2013 to 12% in 2016. In the poorest countries, the
gap is large: 31% in the least developed countries.
On a regional level, there is significant disparity in the gender gap: 23% in Africa compared to
the Americas. In many countries, gender often
intersects with other factors (e.g. location, age)
to create even deeper inequalities. Only a few
countries report higher Internet use by women
compared to men (International Telecommunications Union 2016).
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Such figures give just a partial insight into a complex situation of inequality. Profound changes in
media technologies are typically accompanied by

promises to improve gender inequalities yet such
technologies are often unaffordable for many
groups of women, and gender is often neglected in design, education, and resource processes
crucial to ensuring communication rights. The
emergence of new technologies may generate
new kinds of injustice and exclusion: misogyny
and oppressive gender relations have taken disturbing forms on social media platforms. Such
gendered aspects of media and ICTs significantly hinder social progress, as noted in the agenda
laid out by UNESCO’s Global Alliance on Gender and Media.
Media’s contribution to social progress cannot
therefore be understood without grasping both
the distribution and differentiation of media access, and how they shape possibilities for political and social agency.

2.4 Cultural flows of media within regions
Putting the complexities of media infrastructure to one side, media’s cultural forms and consequences also vary significantly from region
to region. Western colonial powers such as the
United Kingdom, France and the United States
dominated global information flows during and
after the colonial period. Those media culture
flows were unevenly shaped by the long-standing
centrality of the United States, with which even
the United Kingdom and France could not compete. Some Western countries (such as France)
developed media regulation to contest U.S. cultural dominance and foster “national culture”.
In a globalized world, however, more complex
flows of media culture have evolved. Cultural
globalization does not simply homogenize the
world, but instead reorganizes the production
of cultural diversity (Hannerz 1996). By cre-

atively localizing and indigenizing U.S. cultural
influences, some non-Western countries such as
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Japan, South Korea and
India have achieved high levels of media production capacity, especially in the last two decades.
The media outputs of those countries circulate
transnationally and are favorably received within
and beyond their regions, generating important
counterflows to U.S. dominance.
In Latin America, the predominant mainstream
cultural flow is telenovelas, or “soap opera” TV
drama series, which have been exported globally.
Export formats have evolved from selling program series to selling only the show’s central idea
or main character (Biltereyst and Meers 2000; La
Pastina and Straubhaar 2005).12 Mexican, Brazilian, and Colombian television content has shifted what Latin Americans watch on their screens.
If 1970s and 1980s generations grew up watching mainly U.S.-produced imports, today’s Latin
American audiences are exposed to the customs,
life-styles, and social fabric of Latin American
communities themselves. And, although Latin
American media content still privileges the visibility of upper class and predominantly White
groups, some content does depict the experiences of working class and non-White Latin
Americans. Additionally, free trade agreements
and the growing number of migrants from Latin
American countries to North America have generated new North-South media content flows;
since 1994, Spanish-language media has grown
exponentially in the United States, and Univisión
(owned by Hallmark) and Telemundo (owned by
Sony) are the two main Spanish-language cable
television networks. Univisión benefits from an
agreement with Mexico’s Televisa, including a

pipeline of Spanish-language content. Other lesser players in the global field of Spanish-language
media include CNN, BBC, MTV, and Fox, with
news and sports channels entirely in Spanish.13
But overall the unevenness of mainstream audiences’ daily media fare has not changed much
since the mid-1990s: Latin American media include mostly Latin American and U.S. content
(music, films, TV), plus a trickle of Japanese anime and European media content (mainly BBC).
Flows from other regions of the world (Africa,
South and Southeast Asia) are still scarce.
The impact of globalization on African media has
also shifted the flows and contraflows of media
content and capital. After the long dominance of
ex-colonial powers, many countries have recently
developed media production capacities. A prominent example is the growth of the Nigerian film
industry “Nollywood,” which exports to a global audience (Krings and Onookome 2013; Larkin 2008). It has become the third largest global producer of feature films, next to Hollywood
(United States) and Bollywood (India), relying
increasingly on coproduction and distribution
with the Ghanaian film industry. Also notable
are the growing African and global footprint
of the South African media giant Naspers, and
significant foreign investment in African media
firms, especially from China (Xinhua news agency, China Central Television: see Section 2.1).
In Asia, India, Hong Kong, and Japan have developed local film and TV industries and their outputs have circulated within the region for many
years. However, circulation outside the region
has jumped sharply in the last two decades. The
global diffusion of Bollywood films has become

The best example is the Colombian Ugly Betty, which has a Mexican and a U.S. adaptation, each completely different
from the Colombian source, apart from the main character (Miller 2010).
13
http://palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/palabraclave/article/viewFile/4669/pdf
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much more prominent (Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008). In East
Asia, cultural products such as manga, animation, video games, and TV dramas produced in
Japan have generated a regional and global media culture since the 1990s (Iwabuchi 2002). Even
more notable is the so-called “Korean Wave” (or
Halryu, a term first coined by Chinese reporters
in 1999), whereby Korean cultural products such
as films, television dramas, fashion, and popular music (K-pop) have penetrated other Asian
markets (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Kim 2013),
Europe, and Latin America. The Korean Wave
offers an intriguing example of how national cultural policy can be used as a form of soft power,
bolstering local production capacity and promoting the export of media culture by “creative
industries”. South Korea’s interventionist cultural
policies position the Korean cultural industry as
a “sub-empire” of the Hollywood system in Asia.
The “Korean Wave” thus signifies the Korean
culture industry’s ambiguous position as both a
counterflow against the Hollywood system and a
subflow co-opted by Hollywood.
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This complexity characterizes counterflows in
other regions too. The more counterflows to
American media culture advance, the more market-driven governance encompasses them. Even
though relatively independent from the cultural dominance of the “Hollywood empire,” the
rise of media culture flows in non-Western regions has given rise to new intraregional asymmetries. American media culture maintains a
pivotal presence, yet in a way that goes beyond
a straightforward understanding of American
cultural hegemony. Hollywood itself has striven to incorporate capital, talent, and narratives
from many parts of the world and develop outsourcing of postproduction labor on a global
scale (Miller et al. 2004). The rise of non-Western media cultures forms part of a market-driven

recentralization in which diverse players across
the world collaborate to penetrate transnational
markets, engendering a new kind of governance
via marketing, coproduction, distribution, and
copyright monopoly. Section 3 will discuss the
emergence of global governance infrastructures
for the regulation of information and data.
This is not to underestimate the newly emerging landscape of media globalization. Together with the progress of digital communication
technologies, the acceleration of human mobilities from and among non-Western regions (by
migrants, expatriates, students) has complicated
the cross-border circulation and consumption
of media cultures. Meanwhile cultural counterflows between diverse regions and countries cultivate cross-border exchange and dialogue, with
important implications for social progress. Regional circulation of diverse media cultures has
enabled new kinds of cross-border connection,
mutual understanding, and self-reflexivity by
people about their own society and culture. The
mutual consumption of media cultures, for example of entertainment genres popular with women
audiences such as soap operas, has enabled mutual understanding of societies and cultures, for
example in regions such as East Asia. However, as
it is predominantly market-oriented forces that
have advanced cross-border media circulation, it
is the commercially and ideologically dominant
elements of each country’s media culture that
tend to travel, under-representing marginalized
voices (Iwabuchi 2002; 2015). Crucial questions
thus remain: whose voices and concerns are excluded, what perceptions of self-other relationships are typically promoted, and which issues
are under-represented, as the marketization of
media culture flows advances? Section 5 considers the ambivalent consequences for practices of
global citizenship that such media connections
may foster.

2.5 Digital disruptions and transformations (technological, geo-political)
Even before 2005, the global media landscape
was highly uneven, and its implications for social progress correspondingly complex. Some
key developments since the middle of the century’s first decade (when Facebook, the world’s
current most successful social media platform,
was launched) have increased this complexity
considerably. Of course there is not today “one”
Internet – much of the Internet is inaccessible in
language to large sections of the world’s population – but some key patterns are clear.
The key technological development has been
the shift from so-called “web 1.0” – a system
of media infrastructure based on discrete websites, connected by hypertext links, with access
obtained from desktop or laptop computers –
to “web 2.0” characterized by increasing use of
interactive online platforms, in particular social
media platforms. Today, both platforms and
websites are increasingly accessed from phones
and other mobile devices, and the applications
(or “apps”) embedded within them. This change
from a “read only” to a “read/write” interface has
intensified Internet use and its embedding in daily life, heightening institutional attention to how
audiences can be reached online and stimulating
the rise of a vast commercial infrastructure of
online data collection and data processing. This
shift in media as “infrastructure” has involved
also a significant cultural shift, as patterns of use
have changed (a shift in media as “meaning”).
This double shift has multiple consequences.
First, the increasing dependence in daily life on
a complex, distributed online infrastructure for
mediating daily life changes the power dynam-
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ics within the media industries, leading to the
increased importance of the telecommunications industries which provide infrastructures
of connection (Wi-Fi and broadband networks).
Market convergence means that telecommunications providers have the power of control “in
the last instance” over the communication systems on which all content distribution depends
(Bolin 2011). Consider the vast scale of some
new media infrastructure companies: Google’s
annual revenue in 2015 was 74.5 billion USD,
Facebook’s 17.9 billion USD, and Amazon’s 107
billion USD.14
But the global balance is no longer one of simple
U.S. dominance. By the end of 2014, of the top
ten Internet companies in the world, six are U.S.
and four are Chinese. Indeed, the growing power of China’s Internet market, with its distinctive Chinese platforms (Sina’s Weibo, Tencent’s
Wechat) is such that Shi (2015) has argued that
cyberspace now has two camps, GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple) and BATJ
(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Jingdong). As a result,
“the material foundation for U.S.-China co-governance of the Internet is in shape” (Shi 2015).
This observation was made at the 2015 World
Internet Conference Wuzhen Summit at which
the Chinese state’s effort promoted its goal of
shaping the future of global Internet governance,
a strategy with profound implications not only
for China, but also for global communication
politics.
Second, such developing power concentrations
have implications for evermore sectors of everyday life from government to health (SDG 3). Take
also education (SDG 4): concerns are developing
regarding school learning materials increasingly provided not by the state but by commercial
19

media companies such as Apple and Google
through initiatives such as Apple Education and
Google for Education. Weaker welfare and public service systems are creating opportunities for
market advances in areas such as education that
were not previously much commercially exploited (Forsman 2014; Selwyn 2014).
Third, none of these developments would be
possible without a huge double development in
media’s “infrastructures of connection”: the vast
infrastructure of data collection and processing which drives the activities of search engines
and all sorts of digital platforms and, underpinning them, the default infrastructure of “cloud
computing” (Mosco 2014) which provides the
capacity necessary for such data collection and
processing, and for the general expansion of computer-based information processing in everyday
life (for example, the “Internet of Things”). Both
developments expand what we mean by “media”

and create new challenges for governance (see
Section 3).
At the same time, deep inequalities of access remain, as noted in Section 2.2. The African continent, for example, remains characterized by
widespread poverty, huge socioeconomic inequalities, and highly differentiated patterns of
media access and use, with the central parts of
the continent most deprived (Porter and Stern
2015: 17, 50). Such inequalities have important
implications for citizens’ ability to participate in
any mediated public sphere (see Sections 4 and
5).
We cannot therefore say that the “whole world”
is being transformed by media at the same time
and in the same way. Yet the overall direction
of these large-scale transformations is changing
how we think about media’s potential contribution to social progress.

3. The governance of media infrastructures
As we showed in Section 2, the global media
landscape is complex and uneven, reflecting
many diverse histories. The often opaque structures of media governance that have emerged in
the digital era are another factor that complicates
media and communications’ contribution to social progress.

3.1 The evolving relations between media
infrastructures and government regulation
of information flows
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Governments worldwide have expressed interests in regulating media infrastructures. In some
cases, such interests take the form of laws directly prescribing the conditions of information ac-

cess and exchange or the technical capabilities of
media infrastructures. In others, legal incentives
for the takedown of certain kinds of information
produce regulatory effects.
Legal regimes in many countries protect freedom of expression, but all governments prohibit
the publication and exchange of certain types of
information. Additionally, “[m]any democracies now deploy national-level filtering systems
through which all ISPs (or in some cases most
major ones) are compelled to block designated lists of websites to address public concerns
about … illegal activities conducted on the Internet” (MacKinnon 2012: 95). Typical subjects
of legal prohibitions include child pornography,
speech offering material assistance to terrorists,

speech that infringes intellectual property rights,
and speech ruled to be defamatory. Additionally, some countries prohibit the dissemination of
hate speech, and many set limits on the collection, dissemination, and processing of personal
information, although data protection regimes
vary considerably from country to country. There
are good reasons for all these prohibitions, but
each involves governments in decisions about
what is or is not prohibited, and therefore raises
the possibility of overbroad interpretation leading to censorship of other, nominally protected
expression. Such decisions necessarily have implications for the quality of social life and the
possibilities for social progress.
In some situations, legal rules incentivize media infrastructure companies to create notice-and-takedown mechanisms for removal of
prohibited information. To create an additional,
more consistent set of incentives for removal,
many countries have enacted legislation that provides safe harbour from copyright infringement
liability if procedures are followed for removal
of unauthorized copyright-protected materials
from publicly available websites and/or exclusion
of such materials from search results. The first
copyright safe harbour legislation was enacted by
the United States as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.15 Similar provisions
have been enacted in many other countries, often
following inclusion of such obligations in bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements negotiated by the United States (Fink and Reichenmiller
2006; see also Valdes and McCann 2014). More
recently, European legal instruments regarding
privacy and data protection have been inter-

preted to afford enforceable rights to deindexing and erasure of information made available
online.16 Those rulings have prompted some online information providers, including most notably Google, to develop notice-and-takedown
mechanisms patterned after the copyright model
(Powles and Chaparro 2015). Such legal structures play important roles in shaping the “rules
of the game” regarding information flow in daily
life.
Meanwhile, governments in some regions have
invested heavily in the development of technologies for regulating citizens’ informational activities more directly and on highly granular levels.
South Korea, for example, for several years enforced a “real-name system” for Internet access
that prevented anonymous expression online. In
2012, the Constitutional Court of Korea struck
down the real-name requirements, ruling that
they violated Internet users’ freedom of speech.17
Automated content filtering of information supplied via media infrastructures is pervasive. Such
filtering is often justified by asserted needs that
parallel the reasons offered for direct speech prohibitions (e.g., protection against pornography,
copyright infringement, and/or defamation and
harassment); in operation, however, it also seeks
to police and deny access to content for political
reasons (MacKinnon 2012).
On another level, not just governments but corporations (from Europe, North America, and
Asia) are heavily involved in the building of media infrastructures for example through the export of technologies to the Global South. Such
infrastructures often include built-in capacities

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title II: Online Liability Limitation, 112 Stat. 2860,
codified as amended at 17 USC. § 512.
16
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, No. C-131/12, 13 May 2014.
17
Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun-Ma47, 23 August 2012.
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for censorship and surveillance. Chinese companies export technologies similar to those developed to Communist Party specifications for
domestic use (MacKinnon 2012). When the
Zimbabwean government jammed shortwave
broadcasts in the run-up to the 2005 elections, it
was believed to have done so by using jamming
equipment provided by China (Wu 2012). But
North American and European companies such
as Cisco also export information technologies
built to customer specification to enable informational control, and global platform companies
have acceded to demands for censorship to gain
access to local markets (Wu 2012; Stirland 2008).

3.2 The shift from formal to informal governance and the rise of new global/transnational governance institutions
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Direct government mandates, prohibitions, and
procurements are the most obvious mechanisms
through which media infrastructures are governed, but other mechanisms are equally important. The emergence of a networked information
economy and the globalization of mediated information flows have catalyzed two significant
shifts in the nature and quality of governance.
The first is a shift away from formal government
regulation toward informal and often highly corporatized governance mechanisms. The second
is a shift away from state-based governance (and
global governance institutions organized around
state membership) toward transnational governance institutions more directly responsive to
the asserted needs of private entities, often also
corporations, that are those institutions’ “stakeholders”. Both trends, if they continue unabated,
may result in a serious imbalance inconsistent
with SDG 16, which calls for the building of “effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at
all levels”.

Particularly in the Global North but also the
Global South, the information networks and
communication protocols that underlie media
infrastructures are designed and operated by
private, corporate entities. Direct technical authority over networks and protocols gives those
entities an authority that is inherently regulatory. Global platform companies such as Google,
Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple, each
of which occupies a dominant market position
globally, enjoy correspondingly stronger and
more pervasive regulatory power.
The regulatory effects of technology take a variety of forms and produce a variety of effects,
some beneficial and others less so. For example,
security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to networks, servers, and accounts
protect private, personal information and important corporate and government information
from prying eyes and malicious actors. Flawed
or poorly implemented security measures can
introduce vulnerabilities into the network, exposing individuals to identity theft, surveillance,
censorship, and political persecution. Likewise,
flawed or poorly implemented security measures can expose corporations, governments,
and key power and communications infrastructures to espionage and cyberattack. But technical protections applied to media infrastructures
and content flows can also have direct impacts
on important aspects of social life: for example,
affecting the information access necessary for
education, self-development, cultural participation, informed voting, and open and democratic
government (Citron 2008; Cohen 2012). Governance processes in relation to media infrastructures are therefore much more than a “technical”
concern.
There are other examples of how media governance affects social life. Many platform compa-

nies (e.g., Google/YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)
employ filtering algorithms to remove or delist content that infringes copyright and related
rights. Such automated mechanisms for content
removal tend to be overinclusive, removing both
material that is clearly infringing and material
that would be covered by the various limitations
and exceptions to copyright (Quilter and Urban
2005; see also United Nations 2011).

seeking greater regulatory authority over media
infrastructures, the control exercised by corporate entities presents an obvious target for regulatory intervention (Birnhack and Elkin-Koren
2006; MacKinnon 2012; United Nations 2011).
In China, for example, the coordination between
state and private governance is relatively tight,
fuelled by close ties between the state/communist party and IT conglomerates.

In addition, many platform companies employ
predictive algorithms to determine what information to display to their users. In networked
digital media and particularly for mobile applications, access to information is comprehensively mediated by such algorithms, which process
data collected from users, often in combination
with data purchased from other information
collectors and aggregators, and rely on what is
known or inferred about users to generate correlations and predictions (Turow 2011; Bolin
2011). National security services engage in similar data collection and process, often sharing the
results with one another and helping each other
circumvent the restrictions that might apply to
data collection and processing conducted within territorial boundaries (Privacy International
2013). Like the filtering algorithms used for content monitoring, the predictive algorithms used
in commercial contexts are maintained as proprietary trade secrets, while their counterparts
on the intelligence side are maintained as state
secrets. In both cases, secrecy frustrates efforts
to document and understand the effects of such
filtering processes on the flow of daily life and
on everyday freedoms (Cohen 2012; Pasquale
2015).

In North America and Europe, by contrast, the
interplay of state and private governance mechanisms is more complicated. There are powerful
pressures to comply with government demands
for access to information for law enforcement
and national security purposes, as the Snowden
revelations showed. In the wake of those revelations, however, some companies, including most
notably Apple, have redesigned their products
and services to offer users greater privacy for
their communications with each other (though,
as we discuss in Section 3.3, they have continued to collect other data streams for predictive
targeting) and have more aggressively resisted
government demands for access (Yadron 2016;
Powles and Chaparro 2016).

The relationships between governments and the
corporate entities that exercise alternative forms
of governance over media infrastructures are
complex and often contested. For governments

Outside the law enforcement context, dynamics tend to be somewhat different, and reflect a
greater perceived alignment of state and private
interests. For example, U.S. companies that engage in collection and processing of personal
information often count government entities
among their customers (Hoofnagle 2004), and
have looked to the U.S. government to protect
their economic interests in relation to claims for
stronger privacy and data protection regulation.
European information companies, for their part,
value cross-border trade but also look to the European Union for protection against U.S.-based
rivals. With regard to private economic rights in
information, copyright safe harbour legislation
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effectively positions corporate information businesses as the regulators of first resort. So far, however, efforts to impose in law parallel takedown
obligations on payment providers and domain
name system registrars have not succeeded.
The second shift described in this section – from
state-based to transnational governance – involves two types of transnational governance
institutions: trade dispute resolution bodies and
technical standards bodies, in both of which the
relative regulatory influence of corporations is
growing. The global trade system has become
a key mechanism through which both nation
states and powerful corporate actors pursue their
interests in regulating media infrastructures and
controlling information flows. Many completed
global, regional, and bilateral trade agreements
– and many others currently under negotiation –
contain key provisions dealing with recognition
and enforcement of intellectual property rights
and with flows of data and information services
across borders (Calabrese and Briziarelli 2011;
Freedman 2003). Although trade agreements
typically contain provisions exempting protections for public health, environmental protection, and privacy rights from designation as nontariff barriers, 18 the extent of those exemptions is
unclear and their scope contested (Public Citizen
2015a). Arbitral proceedings alleging violations
of trade agreements therefore may work at cross
purposes with efforts by domestic legislatures
and courts and international human rights tribunals to set appropriate limits on right-holder
control of information and on the collection,
processing, and use of personal information to
sort and categorize individuals and communi-

Meanwhile, technical standards bodies have attained increasing prominence and power. Networked digital communications operate via
information transfer protocols. Such protocols
determine the resources to which individuals
and communities have access and, depending
on their design, may enable particular types of
surveillance or afford bottlenecks at which state
or corporate regulatory authority can be brought
to bear (DeNardis 2014; MacKinnon 2012).
Those protocols are the responsibility of an interlocking network of global standards bodies,
including the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). These
bodies have different charges and varying degrees of connection to more traditional governance institutions.
For example, the ITU, which oversees standardization and implementation of a variety of protocols for telecommunication, broadcasting, and
data transfer, is overseen by the United Nations
and representation is state-based, whereas the
ICANN, which oversees the Internet naming and
addressing protocols and maintains a dispute
resolution system for resolving trademark-related domain name disputes, is a standalone corporate body chartered under the laws of California,
with policies set by an elected board of directors.
In these multiple ways, the ability of national
governments, and indirectly national civil societies, to influence the workings of media in

See, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX: General Exceptions,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX;
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV: General Exceptions,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_02_e.htm#article14.
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ties.

everyday life (through governance structures)
has been challenged by the cross-cutting ability of corporate interests to impose governance
through other means. In considering the potential implications of media for social progress we
need therefore to take into account this underlying shift in regulatory power.

3.3 The ambiguous implications of media-based governance for social progress
For citizens, networked digital media infrastructures may lower the costs of access to knowledge and enable new forms of participation in
social, cultural, and economic life (see Section
5). At the same time, however, citizens’ access to
many important informational and cultural resources is subject to control by neo-authoritarian
states and by information intermediaries of various sorts, including Internet access providers,
search engines, mobile applications developers,
and designers of proprietary media ecosystems.
Such control often materially affects the level
and quality of access. The implications for social
progress are clearest when particular materials
are blocked or removed, but mediated access
also produces a range of other effects, which may
or may not be consistent with SDG 9 concerning the construction of “resilient infrastructures”
and the promotion of “inclusive and sustainable
industrialization”.
The increasingly global regime for intellectual
property protection both incentivizes worldwide
distribution of informational and cultural resources and creates additional barriers for those
seeking access to such resources. As already suggested in Section 2.5, licensing requirements for

access to educational, professional, and technical
materials can be onerous and the need to pay recurring fees for continued access to digitalized
resources (rather than, for example, purchasing
hard copies to which one may enjoy permanent
access) disproportionately burdens public institutions and lower-resourced communities. In
the Global South, the costs of access to copyrighted materials can render access infeasible
even for educational institutions and libraries
(Chon 2007; Okediji 2004, 2006). In addition,
a 1967 Berne Convention protocol governing
translation rights is not widely used because its
protections are difficult for developing countries
to invoke. Among other things, the protocol requires that a compulsory licensing system be
fully implemented in domestic law and does not
make adequate provision for minority languages.19 The Global South has adopted a variety of ad
hoc solutions, but the lack of a clear framework
often stymies efforts to make informational and
cultural works available to global audiences that
are linguistically and culturally diverse (Cerda
Silva 2012).
In many parts of the world and for large parts of
the population, everyday life routinely involves
online access to a wide variety of purveyors of
news, information, and popular culture, as well
as search engines, social networking platforms,
and other content aggregators that seek to help
users find, organize, and make sense of it all.
Access to these resources may be offered at no
financial cost to users on an advertiser-supported basis, but often such access has a price, in the
form of the automated collection of information
about personal reading, viewing, and listening
habits (Hoofnagle and Whittington 2014). Such
information can be used both to target advertis-

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Appendix art. II,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P421_79913.
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ing and to suggest content more likely to appeal
to each user.
Such predictive targeting of information access
has a number of troubling economic and political implications. Algorithms for predictive targeting based on data about personal habits and
preferences necessarily enable the identification
of population segments sorted by, for example,
race/nationality, cultural background, religious
affiliation, socioeconomic status, and political
preferences. Commercially, targeting based on
such indicators raises the prospect of invidious
discrimination in the distribution of goods and
services, in decisions about employment and
credit, and in myriad other ways (Barocas and
Selbst 2016; Robinson and Yu 2014). The ability
to conduct relatively granular price discrimination over those goods and services, in ways that
deprive ordinary individuals of choice and corresponding marketplace leverage, sits in tension
with free-market ideologies and raises profound
distributive justice questions (Cohen 2015).
Turning to politics, microtargeting of media content and political appeals that align with (inferences about) recipients’ preexisting inclinations
creates the prospect of an “echo chamber” or “filter bubble” effect, through which preexisting inclinations become reinforced and public opinion
about political and cultural issues becomes correspondingly polarized (Sunstein 2009; Pariser
2011).20 Individuals themselves can come to rely
on filtering processes to simplify the information
environment and reduce information overload
(Andrejevic 2013). In an era in which descriptions of policy problems increasingly are subject
to expert mediation – as with climate change or

A final set of ambiguities concerns the newly
prominent transnational governance institutions
described in Section 3.2. Governance of media
infrastructures and information flows via trade
and technical standards bodies provides harmonization that many argue is essential in an
increasingly interconnected world. But the new
transnational governance institutions are accountable neither to national governments nor to
traditional international governance institutions,
and many lack robust democratic traditions of
their own. Participation in such institutions may
be perceived as offering opportunities for powerful national and/or commercial interests to avoid
roadblocks interposed by domestic regulation,
by the international human rights framework,
and by civil society groups (Benvenisti 2015).
Within the global trade system, both negotiation and dispute resolution processes are highly
responsive to corporate interests yet much less
responsive to other interests. Trade dispute resolution panels convened by the World Trade Organisation have, to date, ruled against states asserting protective regulation in all but one of the
cases in which domestic protective regulations
have been challenged (Public Citizen 2015a).
In recent rounds of negotiation over high-profile multilateral agreements such as the Trans
Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade

In the United States, practices of political microtargeting are becoming widespread. See Lois Beckett, “How Companies
Have Assembled Political Profiles for Millions of Internet Users,” ProPublica, Oct. 22, 2012, https://www.propublica.
org/article/how-companies-have-assembled-political-profiles-for-millions-of-Internet-us.

20

26

the global financial crisis – the filter bubble effect can work to entrench beliefs in ways that are
highly resistant to scientific challenge or debunking (Andrejevic 2013: 12-18, 42-61, 113-32). This
can undermine efforts to mobilize popular and
political support for action toward social progress on various fronts (environmental sustainability, financial accountability, and so on).

and Investment Partnership, trade associations
representing corporate interests have enjoyed
privileged access to country-level negotiators
and working drafts, while civil society groups
and interested members of the public have been
allowed only brief glimpses of later-stage documents, and only on condition of confidentiality.21
Technical standards bodies, meanwhile, are only
gradually coming to terms with their own role
as governance bodies (DeNardis 2009; DeNardis
2014; MacKinnon 2012: 203-19).

ingly in tension with shared flows of information
and open, inclusive development. The multiple
overlapping processes for governing media’s underlying infrastructures are ever more secretive
and resistant to civil society influence. This is
the complex starting-point for thinking about
two important potential contributions of media and communications to social progress: the
role of journalism in the production of public
knowledge (Section 4) and the role of networked
communications in enabling new forms of citizenship (Section 5).

The result is a landscape of everyday media consumption configured by forces that are increas-

4. Journalism and public knowledge
One key way in which media can contribute to
social progress over the long-term is through the
provision of public knowledge (Sen 1999). The
term “public knowledge” refers to the resources
that citizens have for forming informed opinions about matters of public and general interest.
Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for disseminating such knowledge.

4.1 Public knowledge for democracy and
social progress
Digital media infrastructures create new opportunities for the dissemination of public knowledge. Although the decline in civic participation
in established democratic societies has been
widely lamented (Putnam 2000), other observers

(Lewis, Inthorn and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005; Dahlgren 2009) have pointed to the growth of new
communities online and the growth in quantity
and diversity in communication platforms outside of the traditional news media, where citizens can exchange information and participate
in political debate. Additionally, whereas public knowledge traditionally was disseminated
through news and information in the press, radio, and television, social networking platforms
are becoming a major news source for citizens.
A recent survey conducted in the United States
found that 44% of respondents get their daily
news from social media (IPSP 2017). The question of citizenship is complex, and cannot be
dealt with at length here: we note however that
large parts of the world’s population live without citizenship, and citizenship in a nation-state

See, for example, Howard Schneider, “Trade Deals a Closely Held Secret, Shared by More than 500 Advisers,” Washington Post, 28 Feb. 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trade-deals-a-closely-held-secret-sharedby-more-than-500-advisers/2014/02/28/7daa65ec-9d99-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html; Phillip Inman, “MPs Can
View TTIP Files—But Take Only Pencil and Paper with Them,” The Guardian, 18 Feb. 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2016/feb/18/mps-can-view-ttip-files-but-take-only-pencil-and-paper-with-them.
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does not protect citizens from rights-affecting
actions controlled by institutions outside of the
nation-state.
Early research on public knowledge overemphasized news distribution and correspondingly
undervalued other sources of information, such
as popular culture and entertainment (Corner
1991). Both sources of information can contribute to the formation of public knowledge and to
social progress, as can be appreciated when we
consider the political and cultural aspects of citizenship. Where political citizenship deals with
issues related to the formal rights (and duties)
of citizens, and is most often mediated by traditional categories of news about current affairs
and politics, cultural citizenship deals with questions of recognition, identity, and the cultural
rights (and duties) of citizens, and is mediated by
various sorts of information that circulate in the
cultural public sphere.
The distinction between political and cultural
citizenship may become more blurred when the
convergence of entertainment media and political citizenship is taken seriously (Hermes 2005;
Van Zoonen 2005; Williams and Delli Carpini
2011). The rise of bots and algorithmic management of information introduces additional distortions of public deliberation (Tambini 2017).
But none of this potential to create public knowledge matters if media content produced by an
elite “professional” class of journalists does not
resonate with audiences’ everyday lived experience. Today various factors point in that direction, both in forms of propaganda and destabilizing communicative practices and in problems
within systems of education, where much of the
socializing of citizens take place (SPI “Access to
basic knowledge”).
28

In this section we outline, first, the special roles

that journalism plays in public knowledge, and
so why journalism is important for democracy
and social progress. We will then give examples
of the various “soft” and “hard” threats that we
identify as detrimental to public knowledge, including both changes in business models, news
reception, and new forms of “information management,” and, more directly, various physical
threats against news production, and journalists in conflict areas and unstable democracies.
Thirdly, we will point to areas where there are
opportunities for countering this negative picture, for example the rise of citizen journalism
and alternative media. We end this section with
a double case study of organized attempts to construct alternative journalistic narratives in Latin
America and the Middle East.

4.2 The special functions of journalism and
journalistic practice
Journalism is still associated, especially in the
established democracies of the Global North,
with the institutions and practices of democracy
(Fenton 2010: 3). There are many examples, both
historical and current, of how journalism has
contributed to public knowledge for social progress (SDG 16). These include, for example: the
antislavery campaigns that benefited from press
assistance with the formation of abolitionist organizations (King and Haveman 2008), samizdat
publications in the former Soviet Union (Feldbrugge 1975), information about environmental
disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident that was spread not only by mainstream
journalists but also by citizens on blogging and
social media platforms (Friedman 2011) or the
role of the underground press in the struggle
against apartheid (Switzer and Adhikari 2000).
For these reasons the contribution of journalism
to public knowledge remains an important refer-

ence point in the broader context of global social
progress.

4.3 Threats to public knowledge 1: system
pressures

The emergence of digital media infrastructures
has had profound implications for traditional
conceptions of news and journalism. These include a proliferation of the channels through
which journalism is produced and consumed,
and a blurring of the lines between news and entertainment through the rise of formats such as
the “mockumentary,” “docudrama,” and satirical
news. The participatory potential of digital technologies, aided by the widespread accessibility of
technologies such as the mobile phone, has challenged previous claims by professional journalists to exclusivity in the purveying of news. Additionally, the business models for journalism have
undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years, even as new opportunities have arisen
for the creation of public knowledge and citizen
participation in the construction of knowledge
and public debate.

The digitization and marketization of media
(discussed in Section 2) have affected the institutional conditions for journalistic production.
New economic conditions have led the news
industries into a downward spiral where it has
become ever difficult to charge for content. In a
recent survey conducted by the IPSP in the United States, 57% of respondents do not like to pay
for news, and believe news should be freely accessible to all (IPSP 2017). Shrinking readership
makes advertisers abandon print media to the
benefit of online search and social networking.

Against the background of rapid change, however, the expectation that news journalism will
contribute to public knowledge, the monitoring
of power and the facilitation of public debate
remains an ideal against which communication
practices continue to be measured. The mere
fact that information is publicly disseminated
and available does not automatically result in an
informed public. Additionally, in the context of
changing frameworks of reception, citizens’ ability to orientate themselves in today’s increasingly
complex media landscape, drawing perhaps on
the skills provided by education, are ever more
important.

The old business models of journalism are collapsing, and news producers have had to rethink
their relation to audiences, leading in turn to
changes in journalistic practice. New forms of
“click-bait journalism,” robot journalism, and
algorithmically steered news production are increasingly common. These follow different logics
from traditional journalism, and in their most
extreme forms may produce echo chambers or
filter bubbles (see Section 3) that in the long run
fragment public debate and the public sphere
more generally. The automated search for audiences through data processing also may further
marginalize those audiences who are already on
the margins of the public sphere. In countries
where access to the digital public sphere mirrors huge social and economic equalities – for
instance South Africa, India, China, and Brazil
– these new practices could exacerbate such inequalities.
The reorganization of media production into
large-scale media corporations with interests
also in nonjournalistic media production has
meant that even financially successful journalistic and public knowledge operations cannot al-
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ways reinvest their profits into news production,
but instead have their profits reinvested in other
activities. This lack of economic control makes it
difficult to sustain long-term strategies of news
production. While there has always been a tension between editorial and management teams
within news organizations, large-scale media
corporations shift economic decision-making
farther away from news production environments, resulting in managerial decisions that direct journalistic practice from the outside.
There are also regulative threats to independent
news media production, for example the noncommercial and license fee funded public service media. In Europe, the traditional freedom
of public service broadcasters to choose their
policy orientations has come under attack by
newly powerful private broadcasters (SPI “Press
freedom”). One result is the public value test instigated by the European Commission, which
emerged from private broadcasters’ intense lobbying efforts in relation to the European Commission (Donders and Moe 2011).
While online (including mobile) media have created new platforms for social agency and public
participation, both in the creation of “user-generated content” (UGC) for mainstream media
and in providing outlets for alternative news
and views, the Internet has also become a space
where reactionary views, racist representations
and hate speech can thrive. Social media like
Facebook and Twitter contribute to the proliferation of this kind of communication. Misunderstandings of complex matters and online “lynch
mobs” illustrate the volatility of networked digital media environments and offer testimony to
the limits of social media for public debate. On
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a more fundamental level, well-meaning educational initiatives to foster “digital literacy” might
produce relativistic approaches to scientific and
social truths (Boyd 2017), and the journalistic ideals of balance of opinion might privilege
a blurring of the distinction between facts and
opinions, and where “truth” becomes more of an
affective mood.

4.4 Threats to public knowledge 2: coercive
force
Meanwhile, journalists can face harder forms of
threat, whether through legal frameworks (press
freedom or its opposite) or informal threats
(through damage to journalists’ physical and
psychological security): these threats may exist
separately or in combination.
In many parts of the world, growing political instability has affected journalism’s ability to fulfil
its broader public knowledge goals because of
direct threats to press freedom (see SPI “Press
Freedom”). For example, in some parts of Eastern
Europe, political polarization has arisen as some
post-Soviet states have sought closer ties with the
EU. The Ukraine-Russia conflict is one, widely
reported, outgrowth of this polarization, but the
phenomenon is also visible in other post-Soviet
countries (Richter 2015). Information warfare is
on the rise, not only in the region itself, but also
in international news media (for example, via
TV channels such as Russia Today and Ukraine
Today (Miazhevich 2014)). Initiatives for disinformation and propaganda/counterpropaganda,
including so-called “troll-factories” maintained
in Russia (and elsewhere),22 make efforts to enhance public knowledge increasingly difficult.

See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/trolls-putin-russia-savchuk or http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house
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The sheer amount of seemingly contradictory
information circulating puts high pressure on
audiences’ critical abilities (the much discussed
phenomenon of “fake news”). A recent example
of this from the Ukraine-Russia conflict is the
overload of contradictory information that surrounded the shooting down of Malaysian flight
MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the
sharply divergent accounts that circulated on the
Internet both before and after the Dutch Safety
Board published their report of the crash.23 Similar dynamics have emerged in the Middle East,
leading to an increasingly polarized and propaganda-dominated public sphere (see Section
4.6).
In many African countries also, journalism for
public knowledge remains an ideal rather than
a practical reality. In the Windhoek Declaration
on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic
African Press (UNESCO 1991), African journalists invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a motivation for the promotion of
press freedom. At the same time, however, African resistance to colonialism and rejection of
cultural imperialism engendered an insistence
on “African values” in journalism, couched in
the discourse of development but often implying
uncritical and loyalist media support of postcolonial states. An example of an appeal to “African
values” is Francis Kasoma’s (1994, 1996) notion
of “Afriethics,” which rejects Western normative
frameworks and counterposes an African value
system that privileges communalism and an orientation towards the family and clan over individualism. Appeals to “African values” have often
been criticized for their tendency to essentialize
African culture and identity, without acknowledging the interpenetration of African and West-
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See http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/
See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105.

ern values in a globalized context (Banda 2009;
Skjerdal 2012). Additionally, such appeals have
served to justify repression of media freedom
in many African countries (see Bourgault 1995;
Karikari 2007).
Lastly, against the background of political instability, propaganda wars, and state repression,
violence against journalists has also increased.
Some examples include: Egypt clamping down
on journalists, activists, and civil society; the
consolidation of electoral autocracy and temporary closure of digital platforms in Turkey; and
repressive measures from verbal threats to physical assaults and imprisonment in various African
countries. In Poland, a new legal regime has circumscribed the freedom for journalists, making
critical and investigative journalism more difficult and precarious.24

4.5 Opportunities for public knowledge:
new forms of journalism and citizens’ media
Meanwhile, digital media infrastructures have
enabled the growth of new forms of citizen-created media for the production of public knowledge. In many African contexts where legacy
media like newspapers and radio stations are
owned and controlled by the state, digital media
platforms have served as alternative outlets for
the dissemination of news, political debate and
critique (Paterson 2013). In Zimbabwe, Facebook has provided users with more freedom to
engage in political satire and offer alternative
accounts of political developments (Mare 2014).
The widespread penetration and use of mobile
media in Africa have also provided users with
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a tool to engage more actively with mainstream
news agendas. An example of this was the mobile
phone footage of police brutality against a Mozambican immigrant, Mido Macia, in Daveyton,
South Africa. The footage of police dragging Macia, cuffed to a police vehicle, was captured by a
bystander and sent to the tabloid the Daily Sun,
who posted the video online and reported on
it. The video went viral and made headlines internationally after Macia died in police custody,
and led to the arrest and conviction of the police
officers. This integration of citizen journalism,
legacy media (especially tabloids), and online
platforms such as Youtube or Facebook, has provided journalists and news consumers with new
ways of creating public knowledge and serving
the public interest.

and power elites.

In South Korea, citizen journalists have used
digital networks for producing alternative civic
discourses and for mobilizing enormous rallies
of citizens to speak out on socially sensitive issues. More recently, social media have given rise
to new alternative media such as Newstapa (“Rebuilding Investigative Journalism”) launched in
January 2012. Due to the government’s control
over public broadcasting, some former employees of the major TV networks and other smallsized production team members have come together to produce an investigative news program
about social issues. Newstapa uses a variety of online outlets such as its own webpage views, YouTube clips, and podcast episodes, and the younger generations download and watch its weekly
episodes using their smartphones. Social media
also play a key role in spreading the news program’s schedule and in enabling public fundraising to support production. Newstapa has gained
a reputation as an influential news provider and
as illustrating how, through regular practices of
collaboration, citizens can build alternative paradigms of social justice against mainstream media

There are therefore many overlapping factors
shaping media’s possible contribution to public
knowledge in different parts of the world today.
In the next part of this section, we offer a double
case study from Latin America and the Middle
East that considers the possibilities of building
new infrastructures for journalism that can offer
alternative voices to counter perceived dominant
narratives.

Meanwhile, during the political turmoil and violence following the ousting of former President
Yanukovich in Ukraine, faculty and students
from the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv
created StopFake (stopfake.org), an organization
aimed at debunking Russian propaganda and the
distorted news produced by troll-factories. Another civic initiative formed during the political
turmoil was The Ukraine Crisis Media Centre,
which is a platform for information management
that arranges press briefings with representatives
of the Ukrainian military and government (Bolin
et al. 2016).
*

*

*

*

*

4.6 Double case study: TeleSUR and Al-Jazeera: Alternative voices in global news
The Venezuelan channel TeleSUR and the Qatari
channel Al-Jazeera are often hailed as models of
media with global reach that have challenged the
North Atlantic domination of global news flows
and reference-points. These two channels have
much in common: they were both made possible
by the large political ambitions of their founders;
both faced indifference or hostility in the world’s
power centers; and both evolved from single
channels into multiplatform networks. This sec-

tion explores what can be learned from their
contrasting achievements.

TeleSUR
Sponsored by the left-leaning government of
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999 – 2013), TeleSUR was formed in 2005 as a regional television
network with the goal of broadcasting “from the
South to the South” (Da Silva Mendes 2012). TeleSUR’s achievements can only be understood
against the history of media concentration and
economic exploitation achieved by elites in Latin
America since the eighteenth century. From the
inception of electronic media, upper classes have
controlled the media and used them to advance
their own political and financial interests, at the
exclusion of the interests of working class majorities. Through control of commercial and public media, political and economic elites secured
ideological control over, and the opportunity to
profit, from mass audiences.
Former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez created TeleSUR as a television network that would
prioritize the information and communication
needs of the oppressed majorities in the region
and disseminate an autonomous Latin American
perspective. Drawing explicitly from the language of the NWICO, TeleSUR defines itself as
“a Latin American multimedia initiative dedicated to promoting unity among the peoples of the
South; a space and a voice for the development of
a new communication order” (www.teleSURtv.
net). It defines “the South” as a “geopolitical
concept that promotes the people’s struggle for
peace and self-determination and respect for human rights and social justice”. TeleSUR has had
two different goals: to offer an alternative to U.S.
and European news media, (e.g., BBC or CNN);
and to shape a unified Latin American public
sphere (Cañizalez and Lugo 2007). It is not a co-

incidence that TeleSUR emerged in 2005 at the
same time that the region shifted to the left. Its
slogan – “Nuestro norte es el Sur” (Our North is
the South) – embodies this shift in perspective,
and is evidenced by its coverage of key historical
events such as the bombardment of Colombian
FARC guerrilla camps by the military, or the demise of Gaddafi’s government in Libya.
TeleSUR is cofinanced by various governments
in Latin America (Da Silva Mendes 2012). Some
Latin American analysts suggest that TeleSUR is
more the loudspeaker of “Chavismo” (the political platform of late Venezuelan president Hugo
Chávez) than a pan-Latin American voice (Moraes 2011), but TeleSUR makes an important
contribution to public knowledge: information
and news make up 80% of TeleSUR’s programming and the rest centers on renowned Latin
American personalities (Da Silva Mendes 2012;
Rincón in press). In 2009 TeleSUR grew into a
multimedia platform with a strong presence online and its own distribution system. TeleSUR
currently has five satellites covering parts of
Europe and the Americas, as well as the Middle
East and North Africa.

Al-Jazeera
Al-Jazeera, the original Arabic-language channel, was formed in late 1996, following the breakup of BBC Arabic. It was founded by Hamad
bin-Khalifa Al Thani to free Qatar from the influence of its larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and
give the country a regional and global influence
disproportionate to its small size.
Al-Jazeera’s unbridled news coverage quickly
offended Arab leaders accustomed to deference
and Western powers unused to having their narratives of global affairs challenged. By early 2004,
the government of Qatar had received more than
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500 complaints from Arab governments focusing on Al-Jazeera (Lamloum 2004: 20). Originally hailed as a beacon of free speech by the West,
Al-Jazeera became vilified as the loudspeaker of
Al-Qaeda following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The channel became a global household
name in the wake of the Anglo-American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003,
when its deep coverage was reused by Western
news organizations.
In the following years, Al-Jazeera grew from a
single channel to a network of multiple channels,
including Al-Jazeera English, a training center, and online platforms. The Arabic-language
Al-Jazeera’s editorial line was sympathetic to the
centrist Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, to
the Palestinian cause, and to the Global South.
Some of these issues carried over into Al-Jazeera
English, whose editorial line has significant overlap with TeleSUR’s. Al-Jazeera English became a
major global news player, with broadcast bureaus
in Doha, London, New York and Kuala Lumpur,
and dozens of offices and correspondents worldwide. Al-Jazeera however faced problems from
its inception regarding repeated political pressure to restrain its editorial line, internal frictions (Zahreddin 2011), and a conflict between
two factions – one secular and Arab nationalist,
the other Islamist and sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood (Kraidy and Khalil 2009; Talon
2011).
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Al-Jazeera shifted its editorial line with the onset
of the Arab uprisings in 2010. In Egypt, the channel supported the Muslim Brotherhood against
Mubarak. In Syria, it also sided with the rebels
against Assad. Although Al-Jazeera and Qatar
gained some ground as a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, ensuing political shifts, driven by rapprochement between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia, undermined Al-Jazeera’s status as a news

outlet that challenged dominant news agendas.
*

*

*

*

*

The contrasting cases of TeleSUR and Al-Jazeera
illustrate both the opportunities for and the potential vulnerabilities of attempts to create public knowledge outlets from outside the Global
North that have influence on a global scale. Such
outlets can be established and have significant
success, provided strong initial funding and support exists, but they remain vulnerable to the
wider political influences that may lie behind
their funding. That vulnerability however should
not be seen in isolation from the vulnerabilities
to political influence that commercially-funded
media outlets also face in many other parts of the
world.

5. Networked communications: possibilities for citizenship
We have argued in Section 4 that media’s potential contribution to social progress through public knowledge faces significant threats but, in a
digital age characterized by an increasingly global media infrastructure, brings important opportunities too. In this section, we consider how
citizens make use of the informational and imaginative materials that media provide to them.

5.1 Relations between media and spaces of
citizenship
Today’s new density of global communication
not only enables continuous interaction across
world regions, but also is beginning to shape new
spheres of civic communication on every scale.
Communication interfaces (from WhatsApp to
WeChat) offer a new architecture of civic discourse that is no longer merely national or international: the resulting spaces where citizens
interact are shaped not by the media spheres of
particular territories but by individuals’ choices of what to follow online. Furthermore, these
networked spheres of civil communication are
no longer accessible only in the Global North
but engage citizens – with Internet access – from
all types of societies, including so-called failed
states. Through this, media become involved in
opening up new spaces of citizenship (SDG 16.7).
Although citizenship is national and the boundedness of state territory continues, communication is shaping a new form of civic identity,
which is increasingly embedded in a globalized
digital space. Rather than globalization operating outside and against the national, “the nation
is the site of globalization” (Sassen 2007: 80, added emphasis). Today this merging of national
and global takes different shapes in different so-

cieties. Even secluded states such as North Korea
and failed states such as Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan have their own modes of nation-based
globalization. However, the point is particularly
important in relation to public civic communication where national and global public spheres
merge, and public deliberations, legitimacy, and
accountability no longer develop solely through
national debates. Rather, in contexts of climate
change, governments are held accountable based
on broader global discourses.
As with the history of media (Section 2), these
developments are still mainly considered from
the perspective of nations in the Global North,
with narratives often not looking beyond Western communications theory and research (Farivar 2011). Similarly, accounts of diaspora’s use of
media often ignore political connectivity between
expatriates of the Global South that link back to
civic discourse in their countries of origin. The
roles of nongovernmental actors in failed states
and civic communications in postconflict resolution constitute other examples of new forms of
connection between citizens across borders. Citizens of the Global South such as forced migrants
are communicating outside national media territories (Witteborn 2015). Networks of activism,
deliberation, and mobilization, not possible in
the past, are emerging whereby media provide
new infrastructures of citizenship as part of what
the MacBride report called the “many voices” of
“one world”.
Section 2 discussed the historical dominance of
communication flows from the Global North,
linked to colonial communication infrastructures and extended by satellite communication
infrastructures emerging in the 1970s for the
delivery of broadcasting content and, since the
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1990s, for individual media reception. For most
of the twentieth century, the globalized “stretching” of human interactions through media – the
“intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that
local happenings are shaped by events occurring
many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990:
64) – was, in its framing, dominated by news
channels from the Global North, such as BBC,
CNN, and Deutsche Welle, with few opportunities to contest it.
This situation has changed significantly since the
second half of the 1990s due to three interrelated
processes: the emergence of digital satellite platforms enabling the delivery of no longer just a
few but hundreds of channels, the reduction of
uplink costs for broadcasters, and the availability
of cheap direct-to-home roof-top dishes. Furthermore, and most importantly, new regional
media players have challenged the monopoly of
political “breaking news” in times of world conflict. Such news is often delivered “live” worldwide and has influenced national foreign policy
imperatives in various countries (Volkmer 1999;
Robinson 2005), contesting the framing of world
events by media corporations from the Global North (see also Section 4.6). Whereas CNN
produced the only narrative of the first Gulf War
(1990-1991) for a world audience, now there
are hundreds of satellite news channels from
the wider Arabic region, from Sudan, Pakistan,
Tanzania, and at least fifty channels dedicated to
news from India, South Korea, China, Mexico,
and Brazil. In addition, some regionwide news
channels, such as Channel News Asia and Africa
24, are available in several languages and target
neighboring regions.
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The resulting digital ecology for civic participation has two additional key characteristics. The
first is the increasingly complex flow of media

and information organized not just by media
organizations, but by citizens’ own efforts to upload or recirculate what interests them. It is a
transnational public space, which enables a new
density of communication between citizens. The
results of such dense peer-to-peer civic communication may include attempts to influence
individuals through hate speech (Phillips 2015),
fake news and “bots” (see IPSP Chapter 10; IPSP
Chapter 13 Toolkit “Knowledge as Commons”
Column 2). At the same time, new forms of “reflective interdependence” (Volkmer 2014) may
emerge whereby, through the sharing of reference-points across borders, citizens acquire a
new basis for shared political debate or activism
on topics ranging from climate change, human
rights violations and crisis communication to
political campaigns such as the “Occupy” movement. Under these new conditions, civic engagement no longer occurs in one “place,” but across
a network of places.
Although only a minority of the population is
engaged in these new global networks, “their
contribution to democracy cannot be underestimated” (Frere and Kiyindou 2009:77, 79). In
many countries, state monopolies on the inflow
of foreign news are no longer possible. For example, it can be argued that African governments
have “hardly any grip on the choices of the Internet user-consumer, who can freely choose the information that is interesting or useful and decide
to join a particular ‘virtual community’” (Frere
and Kiyindou 2009: 78). This flexibility in the resources available through online media, including information and deliberation accessed across
borders (Bohman 2007), changes potentially citizens’ horizons of civic engagement.

5.2 New forms of communicative citizenship: the case of global youth

“environment,” “human rights,” and “economy,
wealth, and poverty”.

As an example of these emerging trends, young
citizens in many countries are engaging with
each other in unprecedented ways, in peer-topeer interaction within and across borders. In
order to assess the implications of these new digital ecologies for civic identity, we need to consider the interaction between local and global
media practices and information flows.

A Mexican sociologist describes in the context
of Central America the implications of such an
engagement for local citizenship: “the protest
movements with a global reach, and the presence of leadership of young people in them,
bring to mind the emergence of a new political
cosmopolitanism among youth. Its native land is
the world, and its strength lies in its (seeming)
absence of structure, its intermittence and the
multiple nodes in which its utopia is anchored”
(Reguillo 2009: 34). In this analysis Central
America’s young generation is both “disconnected and unequal” and “well situated, connected,
and globalized” and increasingly engaged in
national and transnational youth publics (Reguillo 2009: 23). Other regions provide further
evidence of youth agency converging around
local networks of publicity in Cairo (Arvizu
2009: 387), Tanzania (Tufte and Enghel 2009),
and Chile (Munoz-Navarro 2009). In Kenya and
other parts of the Global South, media provide
platforms for youth to interact and participate in
political debates worldwide, leading one analyst
to comment that, for the Kenyan diaspora, social
media is an “integral aspect [of] Kenya’s social
and political dynamics” (Mukhongo 2014).

The density of these interactions is revealed in
an international comparative study on “Global
Youth and Media, Notions of Cosmopolitanism
in the Global Public Space” (discussed in Volkmer 2014). The study included more than 6,000
14-17 year olds in nine countries on five continents. The study asked how these young people
use media, how they construct globalization
and perceive civic identity. The distinctive uses
of local, national and global media by particular
generations have been little researched. While
national television is the general population’s
preferred medium for political news, young people find news in parallel ways through Google
news, MSN, and Yahoo. Across all society types,
this younger generation mixes local and global
information flows in a distinctive way that entitles them to the label of “in-betweeners”. As a
result, they consider themselves between scepticism and trust, between a realistic appreciation
of global risks (indeed a strong sense of world
insecurity) and the need for leadership. When
asked if they feel that the world today has become
more insecure since their parents were young,
80% agree. Yet more than half consider international political events more important than national and so seem to live out their citizenship on
two connected scales, national and global. They
distrust politicians and engage in global political
spheres characterized by global themes such as

However, the implications of these emerging
forms of public engagement in regional media
cultures require more attention. For example, in
Central Asia, urban youth are drawing increasingly on global sources of information and so
“are increasingly judging the worldviews and behaviours of parents, teachers, political elites and
other traditional authority figures against that
global context … they are suddenly able to compare themselves with anyone, anywhere” (Ibold
2010:532). As anticipated by Joshua Meyrowitz
three decades ago (Meyrowitz 1985), but now
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on a global, not national, scale, media flows can
work to challenge knowledge barriers and destabilize relations between generations, so forging
new bases for civic identity and action.

5.3 Case study: Connectivity and social
progress in a Chinese heritage village
The world’s rural population is at its largest ever
today, even though the world’s urban population is (slightly) larger. An understanding of rural connectivity and its relation to social progress is therefore indispensable. Located in the
mountainous interior region of China’s coastal
Zhejiang Province, Heyang has a population of
3,670 and more than 1,100 years of history. It is
a quintessential embodiment of China’s agrarian
civilization. Its well-preserved Ming-Qing era
traditional architecture earned it a place in 2013
in the Chinese State Council’s list of key sites
of national cultural relics. However, this is also
a modernized and globalized village: with part
of its economy integrated into global circuits of
production and more than half of its labor force
now working outside the village (most of whom
only return briefly to reunite with family during
festival periods).
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Village communications also cut across the traditional and the modern. The oral tradition remains strong: the village’s Senior Center and popular street corners serve as sites of information
and gossip exchange. Public announcements are
posted at centrally located information boards
and walls at different village corners. However,
the village’s lineage book, started more than 600
years ago by a Ming-Dynasty official from the
village, issued its sixteenth edition in December
2016 with a grand ceremony. The book contains
biographies of notable individuals and registers
the names of all male descendants (female de-

scendants were first recorded in its fifteenth edition, compiled in 1995).
Wired radio and communal film projection were
the most popular forms of mediated communication and entertainment during the 1970s
and early 1980s. Along with village assemblies,
these low-tech forms of communication played
pivotal roles in Mao-era political mobilization
and cultural integration. Their embeddedness in
communal life was instrumental to their success
in linking villagers to the outside world and sustaining village cohesion. Starting however from
the late 1980s, information reception and entertainment have become privatized and personalized. As villagers are exposed to wider and more
diverse media flows, many feel more isolated
from each other. Social stratification and income
polarization, following the dismantling of the
collective economy, have engendered a further
sense of social dislocation and community disintegration.
The 1990s saw the village’s further leap into the
digital age: automated direct dial telephone started in 1990; cable television and analogue mobile
telephony arrived in 1994 and by 1997, digital
mobile telephony. Today, Heyang is among the
150,000 Chinese villages with broadband access
(in 2015 China’s State Council promised a 98%
village broadband access rate by 2020). While
desktop computers are rare, telephones, especially mobile phones, are widely used, but only the
young and economically better-off have smartphones to connect themselves to the Internet.
In between lies a wide spectrum of communication patterns and circuits of connectivity that
have made Heyang a small-scale model of China’s highly stratified society. Square dancers in
the village, for example, have used their smartphones to download videos of the latest dancing

styles, in this way imagining themselves as part
of a larger national dance community. A small
minority, like their urban middle-class counterparts, engage in online stock trade. Wechat, the
most popular Chinese social media platform,
is popular among village elites, the young and
the economically well-off. One member of the
Village Council has more than a dozen Wechat
friend circles, with relatives, businessmen originally from the village, government officials,
and students of Heyang’s culture. However, with
inclusion also comes exclusion: such Wechat
friend circles are limited to this member’s own
professional and interpersonal networks, and so
exclude the majority of villagers. Moreover, her
Wechat communications are mostly externally-directed, aiming at promoting Heyang as a
tourist site, rather than at fellow villagers. Meanwhile, with the higher cost of a digital cable subscription, some poorer villagers have given up on
cable television service altogether to opt for satellite television, which only requires the one-time
purchasing cost of a satellite receiving dish. But
such satellite television services do not include
local municipal and county television channels.
Consequently, these households end up with no
access to local television news.
As a result, many local residents, especially those
in the lower social strata, complain about their
lack of communication with village leaders, lack
of effective participation in village affairs, and a
general sense of powerlessness in shaping the village’s future. Caught in a complex web of local
governance, land appropriation, village renovation, and tourist development, villagers resort
to protests and blockages of village construction projects to communicate their demands
and frustrations. In one case, in an attempt to
make their voices heard, some residents refused
to allow a CCTV crew to film their residential
courtyard for the 2015 Spring Festival Gala; oth-

ers have tried to derail the village’s lineage book
compilation project. A few villagers have also expressed a desire for the return of a village wired
radio system and Mao-era face-to-face meetings
of the village community as a whole.
But China’s “great digital leap forward” has not
created upwardly mobile opportunities for all. X.
Zhu, a 24-year-old Heyang village youth, grew
up in a well-off family with postsecondary education, but did not live to see a future in Heyang.
He arranged his own suicide through the Internet in early 2010. Another 24-year-old netizen
came all the way from Yunan Province in southwestern China to commit suicide together with
Zhu. Theirs is one of the saddest stories of digital
connectivity in the Network Age.

5.4 Networked communications among
East Asian precarious workers
Networked communications offer opportunities
in many countries for new forms of political and
social connection, which may be especially important in spreading public knowledge where
public broadcasting systems are under threat (see
Section 4). But this opportunity may occur in the
context of social conditions, particularly labor
markets, where ICTs are intensifying the deterioration of working conditions and sustaining new
structures of precarious labor (SDG 8.8). The resulting balance for social progress may therefore
be highly ambiguous, and Northeast Asia offers
an important example of these tensions.
The mobile phone has become deeply entangled
with the precarious labor culture in Northeast
Asia. Mobile communication technology has
intersected with the emergence of increasingly
insecure working conditions, particularly those
of young Northeast Asian workers, who are sit-
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uated within the “institutionalized precariousness” of a dual economy made up of a large reserve army “with no employment prospects, no
future, [and] no plans” (Bourdieu 1998: 30f),
alongside a small privileged minority of secure
workers with a regular wage. A “mobile precariat” (precarious workers who use mobile phones
to sustain their living within an always-on-call
working culture)25 suffers from chronically insecure job positions as temporary staff or contract
workers: they are trapped at the bottom of the
pay scale, yet at the same time remain connected through media to the workplace (Qiu 2009).
This mobile precariat is disadvantaged not only
through the labor exploitation they endure, but
also when it comes to seeking remedies for these
injustices (see Shaviro 2002; Seo and Kim 2009
for important studies).
Employers’ attitudes vary to mobile phone use
among their precarious workers. Whereas in Japan and Taiwan, workers must leave their phones
behind, beyond their reach, when they start
work, in South Korea, where the conditions for
workers are extremely insecure with the second
longest working hours among OECD countries
(2,124 hours/year as of 2014),26 mobile phones
are allowed at work. However, in all countries,
possessing a mobile phone renders precarious
workers vulnerable to a wider culture of surveillance. Many employers monitor their workers’
lives outside of formal working hours by using
mobile instant messaging services (KakaoTalk
in Korea; WeChat in China; Line in Japan and
Taiwan). Transgressing the normal boundaries
of work, employers use phones to issue orders
to their precarious workers on matters such as
cleanliness, service management, and the employee code of conduct.
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The outcomes are however unstable. In South
Korea, young precarious workers have attempted to stir public opinion against unjust business
practices, by posting images and chat messages
on social media platforms. They, in turn, have
been disciplined through remote monitoring on
live surveillance mobile apps and mobile instant
messaging. In Japan, there have been on- and
offline protests against “black companies,” notorious for exploiting precarious workers, with
workers using the Internet and social media to
disclose their unfair treatment in the workplace
and share it with others. Given the collapse of the
public broadcasting system in Japan, online citizen journalism and alternative journalism have
also offered platforms for building alternative
understandings of social justice in the workplace
that go beyond the agendas of mainstream media.
In summary, Northeast Asia offers a clear example of how the mobile phone as an infrastructure
of connection has become a new technique for
regulating labor in an always-on-call culture, yet
continues to offer opportunities for movements
for social justice and social progress.

Also known as Alba [알바] in South Korea, [xin gong ren 新工人] in China, and Freeter [furita フリーター] in Japan.
OECD.StatExtract, 2016

6. Struggles for social justice through the democratization of media
Having in Sections 4 and 5 considered how the
outputs of media contribute variously to new
forms of social connection and environments of
public knowledge – two preconditions for action
towards social progress – we turn in this section
to the new social issues raised by the increasingly complex governance structures for media and
communications outlined in Section 3. We first
place those issues within the context of a longer-term struggle for media reform.

established alternative media systems as part of
their attempts to seek social progress through
anticapitalistic and nationalistic struggles; the
resulting media structures, however, degenerated into ossified state-controlled systems. Nevertheless, antiestablishment communication forms
(underground tabloids and samizdat in Russia;
the big-character posters on China’s Democracy
Wall) testified to the radical democratic communication impulse of these postrevolutionary societies.

6.1 The longer history of democratizing
media

In the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights movements
in the United States and Canada responded to
poor media coverage of their struggles for social
justice by demanding more access to the mainstream media, and developing their own media
(Stein 2009). The battle around cable television
regulation in these countries was one of the most
salient victories of media reform movements,
as cable companies are now mandated to establish community and educational channels free
of charge (Halleck 2001) (SPI “Access to basic
knowledge”). In Latin America, in response to
the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s,
grassroots groups developed their own underground communication networks in a long battle to pressure states to democratize the media
(Rodríguez and Murphy 1997). Meanwhile, in
several European countries, pirate radio was the
precursor of later struggles for media regulation
that guarantees space for public and community
media (Jankowski, Prehn, and Stappers 1992).

The expansion of media infrastructures into ever
wider areas of life through digital platforms has
generated new types of media activism (Milan
2016). Across the Global South and the Global North, today’s media activists fight struggles
on diverse fronts. However, popular attempts
to shape media infrastructures into more democratic and inclusive social institutions did not
begin with the media activists of the twenty-first
century.
Just as media infrastructures have developed differently in each nation and region of the world
(see Section 2), so efforts to reshape and reform
the media are varied. Before the consolidation
of the advertising-supported commercial press,
radical working class publications in the United
Kingdom, United States and Canada emerged
to challenge the dominant press order (Hackett and Zhao 1998). With the rise of electronic communication, U.S. media activists in the
1920s and 1930s demanded public ownership
of the telegraph and noncommercial radio (McChesney 1993; Stein 2009). In Russia and China, communist and nationalist revolutionaries

In 1976, in one of the earliest global efforts to democratize the media, Amadou Mathar M’Bow,
Director of UNESCO, appointed a commission
of sixteen experts to examine global communication problems. The commission’s final report, known as the MacBride Report, described
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shocking information inequalities between First
and Third World countries (UNESCO 1980). The
report documented high levels of media concentration in a few transnational media corporations
mostly located in rich, industrialized countries.
Such concentration had many damaging consequences including highly unequal information
flows between rich and poor countries; a lack of
diversity among the voices and sources of information and communication; and a flow of media
content from the North to the South that threatened the latter’s local cultures. The MacBride Report argued that a New World Information and
Communication Order was urgently necessary.
Efforts towards a NWICO, including recommendations for national communication policies, reduced media concentration, more Southto-South communication channels, and a mass
media code of ethics, embroiled UNESCO in a
high-profile dispute with the United States, who
interpreted the report’s recommendations as a
threat to “freedom of the press,” defined within the liberal framework as freedom from government control. In 2003, the Communication
Rights for the Information Society Campaign
(CRIS) emerged as a new moment of global
media reform. The CRIS Campaign, which still
continues, encompasses four pillars of communication rights: the right to participate in the public sphere; the right to knowledge; civil rights in
communication; and cultural rights in communication (Siochrú 2005).
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The first two decades of the twenty-first century
have been marked by UNESCO’s efforts to protect
journalists and defend freedom of expression.
The UN Human Rights Council’s “Resolution on
the Safety of Journalists” (2016) is welcome, but
does not yet extend to Russia and China. In 2015,
Member States endorsed the concept of “Internet
Universality” which includes four principles for

Internet governance: human rights, openness,
accessibility and multistakeholder participation
(UNESCO 2015).
Looking back over the past four decades, international governmental organizations and media activists have broadened their platforms and
struggles to include communications as an important dimension of social progress. As Laura
Stein notes: “communication policy activism
spans the gamut from representational concerns
with the end products of communication to the
deep-seated political, economic, regulatory, and
infrastructural issues that shape the larger cultural environment” (Stein 2009: 2- 3). At stake
in this continued battle is a foundational change
in the governance of media and communications
infrastructures no less profound than that called
for urban governance in Chapter 5. We turn for
the rest of this section to specific struggles that
target the underlying communications infrastructure of the digital age and its increasingly
complex needs for governance.

6.2 Transparency and accountability of
media infrastructures and mediated data
flows
The last decade has seen the emergence of increasing global concern about the transparency
and accountability of media infrastructures and
the data flows that they carry (SDG 9; SPI “Access
to information and communications”). In some
cases, those concerns have prompted popular
protests and engendered new forms and sites of
resistance. One important category of concern
about transparency and accountability relates to
the conditions of access to information online.
Populations worldwide have begun to pay attention to the effects of private agreements for preferential treatment that, behind the scenes, struc-

ture the universe of information they see (IPSP
2017).
Initially, struggles over preferential treatment
took the form of efforts to secure formal enactment of the principle of “network neutrality”.
Proponents of network neutrality argued that Internet access providers should treat all content,
sites, and services equally without 73
discriminating among different sources, services, or providers, while Internet access providers sought greater leeway to experiment with
differential quality of service. For the most part,
countries around the world have resolved this
debate in favor of network neutrality, although
European regulations create a preferential exemption for certain specialized, high-bandwidth
services.27 Since there is no reason to believe that
unregulated markets by themselves will preserve
anything like network neutrality, this issue is
likely to remain important for media’s positive
contribution to public knowledge.
Formal regulatory adoption of network neutrality mandates, however, has not resolved disputes
about preferential access, but has simply shifted
the terrain. Worldwide, regulatory implementation of network nondiscrimination mandates has
often been followed by so-called “zero-rating”
initiatives. Zero-rating refers to an arrangement
by which an Internet access provider or mobile
services provider agrees to exempt a particular
content service from the data caps otherwise
imposed on its users. Such agreements may be
made in return for flat payments or in return for
access to data about the behavior of users as they
use the zero-rated service. Zero-rating agree-

ments tend to drive traffic toward exempted data
services, to the advantage of those providing
them, so indirectly challenging the net neutrality
principle.
A second important category of transparency
and accountability issues relates to targeted removal of online information. Such removal may
be mandated or initiated by an information intermediary (for example, a platform company).
It may also involve the threatened (or feared) assertion of intellectual property rights, a request
for removal or de-indexing in connection with
rights afforded under data protection regulation, enforcement of privately-defined acceptable-content policies, or direct state censorship.
Because the failure to remove some types of information can itself raise justice issues, targeted
removal may sometimes be appropriate. Very often, however, such content filtering mechanisms
remain secretive and unaccountable. Concerns
about secret and unaccountable content filtering
have sparked protests around the world, resulting in a new model of activism that takes digital media simultaneously as a site and target of
protest activity. Such activity has achieved political gains, but arguably also accelerated the shift
toward corporatized governance (described in
Section 3.2).
In the United States, a protest movement that
originated domestically and then spread globally defeated proposed legislation tried to impose
content filtering obligations on domain name registrars and payment providers (Herman 2013).
Subsequently, however, major U.S. payment providers have acceded to a set of voluntary “best

For the U.S. regulation, see “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,” 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (Apr. 13, 2015). For the
European Union regulation, see Regulation 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2015 laying down measures concerning open Internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on
roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, L 301/1.
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practices” that involves them more actively in
private intellectual property enforcement (Bridy
2015). In Australia, a popular protest movement
opposed a government proposal that would have
required Internet service providers to perform
mandatory content filtering; the government
eventually withdrew the proposal after political opposition proved firm, and after the major
Australian ISPs voluntarily agreed to block 1,400
sites previously identified as child pornography
purveyors.28 In China, where state involvement
in filtering and suppression of dissident or otherwise disfavored expression is more direct, protest
movements have taken correspondingly more
indirect forms that involve the use of seemingly
innocuous code words to discuss forbidden topics (Link and Xiao 2013).

Many dominant market providers – Google and
Baidu in search, Facebook in social networking,
Twitter in microblogging – use predictive algorithms to structure the universe of information
that users see, and network neutrality mandates
do not address those practices. Such algorithms
operate invisibly to create displays to users that
are tailored to what is known or inferred about
that user. To individual users, however, the displays may appear universal and neutral. As we
noted in Section 3.3, there are important, unresolved issues concerning the accountability of
such automated filtering.

Anticensorship and “Internet freedom” activists
have developed new, crowd-sourced methods of
discovering and documenting content removal efforts and actions, producing web sites such
as chillingeffects.org, a U.S.-based site that catalogues copyright takedown notices, and onlinecensorship.org, a project by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation that catalogues content removals by social media sites. Some global platform companies, such as Twitter and Google,
have begun to disseminate information about
various types of targeted removals (e.g., Google’s
“transparency report”), although they have been
much less forthcoming about their own acceptable-content protocols.

The new concentrations of power exerted via
media infrastructures and mediated data flows
have themselves generated rising levels of concern, prompting activism by civil society groups
and sometimes more widespread protests and
struggles (SDG 9).

A final set of concerns about transparency and accountability relates to processes of automated, algorithmically-processed mediation and filtering.

One important cluster of issues involves proprietary claims to information networks and resources. Even as digital media activists and civil
society groups have pushed for greater legal freedom to store, share, and modify content online,
law enforcement authorities around the world
have pushed to make outlaws of individuals and
businesses who facilitate file-sharing. Enforcement has proceeded both via highly-publicized
litigation and by off-the-record efforts to seize or
block access to Internet domains (McCourt and
Burkart 2003; Palmer and Warren 2013; see also

A. Ramadge, “Get Up! Organizes Advertising Blitz to Protest Internet Filter,” 4 Dec. 2008, http://web.archive.org/
web/20090215191458/ http://www.news.com.au:80/story/0,,24750766-2,00.html; R.N. Charette, “Australian Government Gives Up on Filtering the Internet,” IEEE Spectrum, 12 Nov. 2012, http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/it/australian-government-gives-up-on-filtering-the-Internet.
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6.3 New concentrations of power via media
infrastructures and mediated data flows

Bridy 2015). In addition, as discussed in Section
3.2, both nation states and powerful corporate
actors have sought enhanced intellectual property protection through trade agreements. In
Europe, popular opposition to the prospect of
stepped-up intellectual property enforcement
defeated ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, which had been negotiated
with the United States, Japan, and other countries. However, many provisions for enhanced
enforcement have appeared in a different agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which was
signed in 2016 but has not entered into force)
(Public Citizen 2015b). Less is known about another agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, now under negotiation
between the United States and Europe.
Another set of issues relating to power exerted
through today’s fast-changing media infrastructures involves the surveillance conducted by powerful third parties, such as nation-states (IPSP
2017). In the wake of the revelations by Edward
Snowden about the extent of the U.S. National
Security Administration’s surveillance of global electronic communications, both ordinary
citizens and governments worldwide protested
NSA’s lawless and seemingly unconstrained behavior. The Snowden revelations, however, also
showed that national security services in multiple jurisdictions – including some of those now

protesting most loudly – cooperated with the
NSA and with each other, helping to form a network for evading existing domestic procedures
for oversight (Privacy International 2013).29
Resistance to those efforts has taken varied
forms. Some experts in computer security have
formed ventures to develop and market secure
“black phones” and online tools, while others
have helped activists and civil society groups to
explore, understand, and expose the full range
of lawful and unlawful government surveillance
activity.30 As described in Section 3, some large
information companies also have actively resisted the expansion of government surveillance.
One country, Iceland, has resolved to develop
comprehensive legislation establishing itself as a
safe harbor for whistleblowers and investigative
journalists.31
Civil society organizations and, more recently,
frustrated legislators, have put sustained pressure
on trade negotiators to make treaty processes
more transparent and democratically accountable.32 New political movements and parties have
formed around platforms for access to information and free culture (Beyer 2014), and the free/
libre/open source software (FLOSS) movement
has worked to foster the development and adoption of open systems that may be freely used and
adapted (Coleman 2013; Gamalielsson and Lun-

E. MacAskill and J. Ball, “Portrait of the NSA: No Detail Too Small in Quest for Total Surveillance,” The Guardian, 2
Nov. 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance.
30
B. Schneier, K. Seidel, and Saranja Vijayakumar, “Worldwide Encryption Products Survey,” Version 1.0, Feb. 11, 2016.
Available: Schneier on Security, https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/worldwide-survey-of-encryption-products.pdf; S. Laskow, “Is Communications Security for Reporters Improving?,” Columbia Journalism Review, Aug. 11,
2014, http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/is_communications_security_for.php; A. Rinehart, “Encryption Becomes a
Part of Journalists’ Toolkit,” HuffPost Media, Apr. 10, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-groundtruth-project/
encryption-becomes-a-part_b_7041278.html.
31
International Modern Media Institute, “IMMI Resolution,” https://en.immi.is/immi-resolution/.
32
Perhaps as a result, some provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s intellectual property chapter are less draconian
than they had been in earlier, leaked versions of the proposed text. See K. Cox, “Analysis of the Final TPP (Leaked) Text
on Intellectual Property: Mixed Results,” InfoJustice.org, 15 Oct. 2015, http://infojustice.org/archives/35159.
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dell 2014).
A third cluster of struggles involves efforts by
privacy activists and researchers to mobilize civil
society groups and the public against commercial information power. This struggle needs to be
understood within a wider diagnosis of contemporary media infrastructures’ central role in the
emergence of a new form of surveillance capitalism, whereby populations worldwide comprise a
source of raw materials for new practices of surplus extraction (Cohen 2015; Zuboff 2015).
Disputes over these questions are as widely varied as the contexts and population groups involved. In the United States and Europe, commercial surveillance practices have engendered
legal struggles over behavioral credit monitoring, drawing attention to the role of predictive
profiling in the high-risk lending practices that
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008
(Pasquale 2015). Meanwhile, in an effort to enlist users themselves in both frustrating and exposing the practices of surveillance capitalism,
teams of researchers have worked to design new
privacy tools, such as ad blockers and tracker
visualization tools (Eaglehardt and Narayanan
2016; Kennedy 2016).
In the Global South, struggles over the spread of
surveillance capitalism have involved challenges
to public-private partnerships for the delivery of
services. In India, debates concerning the possible uses of a new national identification number

More generally, in the international development
context, attention to data protection questions
has highlighted how routine practices of data
collection and sharing can put local populations
at risk (Taylor 2016b) (SPI “Private rights”).
There is a deep, if rarely noticed, continuity
between these recent debates about control of
networked information flows and the struggles
of indigenous peoples against broadcasters for
many decades. For example, Australia’s Aboriginal communities have developed protocols that
regulate how media makers – both individual media producers and media industries – can
proceed on Aboriginal lands and among Aboriginal communities (Janke 1999; West 2014). Any
individual producer or media industry intending
to operate among Aboriginal communities must
gain clearances from Aboriginal custodians be-

Manan Kakkar, “Companies, Processes and Technology behind India’s UID Project, Aadhaar,” Oct. 1, 2010, http://
www.zdnet.com/article/companies-processes-and-technology-behind-indias-uid-project-aadhaar/; Shweta Punj,
“A Number of Changes,” Business Today, Mar. 4, 2012, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/uid-project-nandan-nilekani-future-unique-identification/1/22288.html; Silvia Masiero, “UID/Aadhar and the PDS: What New
Technologies Mean for India’s Food Security System”, India at LSE, May 5, 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaatlse/2014/05/12/uidaadhar-and-the-pds-what-new-technologies-mean-for-indias-food-security-system/; Jean Dreze,
“Unique Identity Dilemma,” The Indian Express, Mar. 19, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/
unique-identity-dilemma/. See section 6.3.
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have proved sharply divisive. In 2015, the Indian
government launched the Digital India Initiative,
which is based on the use of the Aadhar Unique
Identity (UID) scheme for biometric authentication of recipients of government benefits and services. The Aadhar scheme, which is the world’s
largest biometrics-based database initiative, was
developed by corporate technology partners, and
critics charge that too little is known about its capabilities and potential future uses (see also the
India case study in Section 6.4).33 In Sub-Saharan Africa, questions have been raised about the
undisclosed uses of data collected via privately
funded mobile telephony and banking initiatives
(Hosein and Nyst 2013; Taylor 2015, 2016a).

fore capturing, disseminating, reproducing, or
archiving data about the land or the people. By
defining a framework of respect, integrity, authenticity, and consultation with Aboriginal authorities and custodians, Aboriginal protocols
have sought to ensure media accountability. Far
from seeing such protocols as part of a “local
culture” that unhelpfully resists “progress” (compare IPSP Chapter 15), we need to look to them
as precursors of the fundamental changes needed in the governance of data flows. But no such
protocols have yet been developed to govern data
flows in the wider development context.

6.4 Case Study: Civil Society Activism in
India: Facebook Free Basics34
Recent events in India offer an example of the
ability of civil society activism to challenge the
power of global digital platforms. We will focus
here particularly on Facebook’s proposed introduction of its “Free Basics” platform for Internet
access, but will situate the struggle over Free Basics in the broader context of other disputes over
information rights in India in recent years.
Facebook’s Free Basics platform is a joint private-public partnership ostensibly committed
to expanding Internet access for first-time users
of the Internet in select countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Facebook’s CEO, Mark
Zuckerberg, launched the initiative in 2013
(originally branded as Internet.org) in partnership with Samsung, Ericsson, MediaTek, Opera
Software, Nokia, and Qualcomm. It was based
on an “app” that enables smartphone users limited, free access to certain sites and services on
the Internet, and that is designed to function on
less robust 2G networks, potentially encouraging users to subscribe to mobile access packages

34

Case study written by Pradip Thomas.

(Hemple 2016).
From the Indian government’s perspective, Free
Basics represented an opportunity to expand its
digital footprint into the daily lives of Indian citizens, by integrating Free Basics within its flagship Digital India initiative (discussed in Section
6.2). The Indian PM Narendra Modi’s attempts
to use social media including Twitter, Facebook,
Youtube, Instagram, and other platforms for political purposes are well known (Pal, Chandra
and Vydiswaran 2016). In September 2015, he
met Mark Zuckerberg in Silicon Valley, California (Mukherjee 2015). For Facebook, signing
India to Free Basics would have given Facebook
unrivalled access to the members of its second
largest market (125 million users). The deal was
celebrated on Facebook with both Modi’s and
Zuckerberg’s profile pictures wrapped in the
green, orange, and white of the Indian flag, leading millions of users to update their profiles with
the tri-color.
Civil society activists however viewed Free Basics as an attempt by a commercial vendor to
tether users to its product and monopolize the
terms of access to the wider Internet, so compromising the tenets of network neutrality (discussed in Section 6.2). While civil society groups
in India had previously advocated specific reforms such as banning software patents and support for free and open source software (FOSS),
a new “Save The Internet” campaign mobilized
millions of users to petition the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to uphold the
broad principle of network neutrality. Facebook
was completely caught off guard by the extent of
the mobilization of Indian civil society in India
against Free Basics.
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In February 2016, the TRAI acted to uphold the
principle of network neutrality. TRAI’s regulation, titled “Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs
for Data Services Regulation” provides that “no
service provider shall offer or charge discriminatory tariffs for data services on the basis of
content”. TRAI’s response was surprising given
its previous support for industry interests over
those of civil society (Abraham 2016). Additionally, while trade bodies such as the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) supported
“differential pricing,” others such as the National
Association for Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) opposed it.
This episode, which illustrates both the potential for cozy, mutually beneficial relationships
between global platform companies and nation-state governments and the ability of civil
society to challenge such relationships, needs to
be put in the broader context of grassroots struggle for information rights in India in recent years
(SPI “Access to information and communications”). Campaigns spearheaded by individuals
such as Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey and organizations such as the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information led to the Indian government enacting the Right to Information Act
in 2005. Such campaigns, along with a variety of
social movements for information rights, created
a broader recognition of the need for knowledge
of entitlements and rights, facilitated access to
information, and transparency and accountability in the disbursement of public funds.
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This broad Right to Information movement laid
the foundations for the subsequent struggles not
only against Facebook’s Free Basics initiative but
also against the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID)
scheme (discussed in Section 6.2). A number of
the organizations that contested Free Basics also
contest the Aadhar initiative. They have consis-

tently highlighted shortfalls in the collection of
biometric data, the security and authentication
issues that surround a centralized database on
citizens, the potential for misuse of private information and for mass surveillance of citizens,
and the absence of privacy laws. While the government has defended the scheme as a means to
combat benefit fraud and protect national security, critics highlighted successfully the threat to
basic freedoms from this expansion of the digital
infrastructure.

6.5 Normative implications of media infrastructures and mediated data flows
The developments discussed in this section
raise three broad sets of normative implications:
for autonomy, economic justice, and political
self-determination.
First and most basically, new and unaccountable concentrations of power exerted via media
infrastructures and mediated data flows have
implications for individual autonomy. As media
infrastructures become more pervasive in everyday life, they increasingly mediate the human experience of the self, the other, and the world. As
they connect individuals and communities, they
also structure the universe of information and
personalize informational exposure. The dynamics of continual, feedback-driven personalization
invest information intermediaries with enormous power over processes of individual self-determination, which in a less intensively mediated
world have been much more open-textured and
amenable to serendipity (Cohen 2012). Since individual autonomy is a necessary element of any
form of social progress, it is essential to consider
the implications of such large-scale media-based
developments for the ongoing goal of social
progress.

Second, as described in Section 3.3, the emergence of new economic models based on surveillance, social sorting, and predictive profiling
has implications for economic justice (SDG 9).
The necessary frameworks for protective regulation against such forms of data extraction are
incompletely developed and unevenly implemented. Moreover, as privacy activists and civil
society organizations worldwide have worked
to raise public awareness of surveillance and its
threats to privacy, they have struggled against an
antiregulatory discourse that aims to defeat protective regulation by linking surveillance tightly
with a generalized innovation imperative (Cohen 2016).
Finally, commercial and government practices of surveillance, social sorting, and predictive
profiling have profound implications for political self-determination. The basic possibilities for
political self-determination are important not
just for political processes themselves, but also
for wider processes of human development, richly understood (Sen 1999). Yet there is mounting
evidence that predictive algorithms can be used
to alter user behavior, in ways that implicate values of democratic self-governance and the rule
of law. Facebook has publicly acknowledged conducting experiments on how personalization of
the content in newsfeeds can affect users’ moods
and other experiments reminding users to go to
the polls and vote (Grimmelmann 2015). There
is no guarantee that future experiments would
be disclosed, nor is Facebook subject to ethical
guidelines similar to those that constrain human-subject experimentation in other contexts.
Google’s chief economist similarly has characterized Google’s user base as subjects for experimentation (Varian 2014).
The prospect that large information intermediaries may enjoy wholly unaccountable power to

manipulate the flows of social and public knowledge is alarming. More generally, the continuous, immanent, and highly granular regulatory
processes by which such privately controlled intermediaries exert power via media infrastructures (and the new discourse of human development through the exploitation of “big data”
which helps legitimate such power) exist in tension with broadly shared commitments to due
process and the rule of law (Hildebrandt 2015).
We end this section with an important case
where the broad social justice issues raised by
the governance of media and communications
infrastructures entered the political domain: the
civil-society based NETmundial initiative which
emerged in Brazil in the wake of the Snowden
revelations.

6.6 Case study: Brazil’s Marco Civil on
Internet governance
After the Snowden scandal of 2013 revealed
mass electronic surveillance and espionage by
U.S. intelligence agencies, diverse global initiatives to defend the freedom of the Internet
emerged from civil society. At the time of writing, the most progressive regulatory framework
for the Internet is Marco Civil da Internet (Civil
Rights Framework for the Internet), an initiative
developed jointly by Brazil’s civil society and the
former government of Dilma Rousseff. Unlike
authoritarian states who show greater concern
over the implications of the Internet for regime
stability than for freedom, and unlike liberal democracies in North America and Europe – who
fear increased state control and often defer to
private, corporatized governance of media infrastructures – Brazil supports universal free Internet, while being also critical of the international
governance structures that guide it (Trinkunas
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and Wallace 2015: 2). The Marco Civil is an exemplar of alternative ways of thinking about Internet governance and its relation to wider social
justice, without claiming that, by itself, a regulatory framework can create a different type of
Internet infrastructure, let alone address all the
issues of power to which any communications
infrastructure gives rise.
The Marco Civil sought to rethink what freedom
and citizenship mean when it comes to the Internet. Adopted on April 23, 2014, the Civil Rights
Framework is intended as a prototype for Internet regulation globally. The Marco Civil emerged
from NETmundial, a conference convened by
Brazil’s national Internet steering committee
and organized as a multistakeholder dialogue
between government, industry, and civil society.
The framework that became the Marco Civil was
developed through a series of online and offline
deliberations that invited Brazilian citizens to
shape a legal framework for Internet regulation.
It is significant not only as an initiative born from
civil society in dialogue with government and
private sectors, but also as a proposal emerging
from the Global South, framed by social movements committed to the idea of communication
rights. The Marco Civil has the potential to act as
a balance to the global power of the United States
on Internet governance issues.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet advances the commitment to respect for
civil rights as an important component of Internet regulation and governance. Recognizing the
vulnerability of users, the Marco Civil emphasizes the Internet’s social goals, protects the rights
of Internet users, and proposes the adoption of
open source technologies that allow free access
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to information, knowledge, and culture. In the
eyes of civil society activists (Gutiérrez 2014), the
most important achievements of Brazil’s Marco
Civil include protection of freedom and privacy,
open governance, universal inclusion, cultural
diversity, and network neutrality.
The Marco Civil considers access to the Internet fundamental to democracy, as it is essential
for participation in political life and cultural
production, and part of the right to education
and freedom of expression. It therefore advocates reducing inequalities in access to digital
technologies and promotes the development of
competencies to use digital platforms effectively.
It proposes universal Internet service with controlled rates and sufficient connection speed and
also promotes education on the rights of consumers, ethical consumerism, and protection
against misleading advertising and deceptive
business methods (Compare SPI “Access to basic
knowledge”).
The Marco Civil stipulates that, while Internet
providers are free to compete, they are also responsible for guaranteeing freedom of speech,
freedom of access to information, net neutrality,
and protection of privacy. The Marco Civil forbids any type of discrimination based on disability, sexual orientation, or political or religious
affiliations. It also provides for the protection of
users’ data and reputation and the right to the
free development of personality,35 and guarantees the right to access information and the right
to rectification (SPI “Access to information and
communications”). The Marco Civil states that
citizens should be encouraged to move from being mere consumers of information, knowledge,
and culture to becoming content creators. The

Compare the similar ‘right to free development of [the] personality’ recognized in German law: Article 2 of the Grundgesetz.
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framework calls for the development of appropriate digital tools to facilitate the creation of
information, knowledge, and culture by citizens,
and states that the Internet should promote the
production and circulation of such local content.
Not surprisingly therefore movements that defend the freedom of knowledge strongly support
this new code, to which Brazil’s free software
community was a principal contributor (Gutiérrez 2014). As initially proposed, the Marco Civil
also mandated that all information and content
about Brazil should be archived in Brazil, but
that restriction was removed following lobbying by transnational Internet corporations. Ultimately, the Marco Civil provided that all Brazilian Internet content or content about Brazil is
considered “Brazilian” and can be the object of
observation. The Marco Civil eliminates criminal
copyright penalties for content usage by citizens.
It however recognizes civil copyright laws that
limit access to digital content and hinder collaborative creation, in tension with the goal of an
entirely free digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet mandates network neutrality (discussed
in Section 6.2), and prohibits discriminatory ac-

tion against any type of content or user, either by
changing the speed of transmission or restricting content. Network neutrality ensures that all
data travels at the same speed and without any
restrictions based on the nature of the content or
the nature of the user. Brazil’s Marco Civil forbids
blocking, monitoring, filtering, or analyzing content for commercial, political, moral, religious,
or ideological reasons. The principle of network
neutrality is here affirmed as essential to a collaborative and democratic digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework proposes a model of governance through multistakeholder, transparent, collaborative, and democratic mechanisms. The creators of the Marco
Civil hoped to inspire activists and civil society
organizations in other countries to demand similar laws (Gutierrez 2014), proposing “a global
Internet that promotes freedom, inclusion, and
diversity” (Trinkunas and Wallace 2015: 37). The
code’s provisions were in many cases opposed
by global platform companies and sometimes
defeated. It remains too early to determine the
long-term influence of the model proposed,
but its significance as an alternative to standard
models of governance remains.

7. Struggles for social justice through media
We come in this final main section of the chapter
to consider the distinctive role that media and
communications play in struggles for social justice and those struggles’ overall contribution to
social progress. The transformation of media infrastructures in the final decades of the twentieth
century gave rise to new communication ecologies, which enabled divergent worldviews and
political interests to draw on a multitude of media resources in their struggles for social justice.

7.1 Appropriating the Digital
Individuals and communities around the world
have learned to appropriate media, especially digital communications infrastructures. The
most notable late twentieth century case of appropriating media for social justice was provided
by the Zapatistas in Mexico.
In 1994, just as Mexico was preparing to sign
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the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with the United States and Canada,
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
(EZLN) (Zapatista Army of National Liberation),
an indigenous guerrilla organization, abruptly came to national attention by seizing towns
in the region of Chiapas and demanding land,
work, food, housing, education, independence,
freedom, justice, and peace for Mexico’s indigenous communities. The Mexican government
attempted to annihilate the EZLN before news
of the group reached the global public sphere
but did not succeed. The EZLN’s resistance has
been analyzed from many perspectives, but in
this chapter its importance lies not in its general
repertoire of activism, but more as an exemplar
of how, in the late twentieth century, media and
culture came to be appropriated in new ways by
social justice movements.
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Using diverse media technologies and strategies, the Zapatistas activated a communication
network that linked Mexican indigenous communities with social justice activists worldwide.
In terms of media technology, Zapatista videos
recorded on VHS tapes were carried out of the
Lacandon jungle to the nearest urban centers
and then on to Mexico City, where U.S. activists
picked them up and took them to Austin, Texas to be digitized and uploaded on computer
listservs; meanwhile Zapatista audio recordings
and texts were translated into multiple languages and disseminated via then-emerging digital
platforms. In terms of cultural message, Subcomandante Marcos, the main spokesperson of
the Zapatistas at the time, used these practical
means to issue statements that framed the local
struggles of marginalized Mexican indigenous
communities as aligned with other social justice
and identity struggles in the Global North and
Global South (Rodríguez, Kidd and Stein 2010),
proposing himself as standing in for “every un-

tolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is
. . . now beginning to speak” (Subcomandante
Marcos 1994).
Through their distinctive use of communications
(both technological and cultural) the Zapatistas
served to link social justice collectives and individuals worldwide into a wave of international
solidarity in the global public sphere, alerting
the Mexican government and its army that the
whole world was monitoring human rights abuses against indigenous communities in southern
Mexico (Pianta and Marchetti 2007). Social justice activists in many countries worldwide came
to adopt Zapatista language, goals, and communication strategies. “Zapatismo” came for many
to represent a new type of social justice activism, based less on formal institutional structures
and more on “participation and deliberation,
collective autonomy, and decentralized power
structures” (Ferron 2012: 157). Marcos’ specific
manifesto for the “construction of a world where
many worlds fit” (EZLN 1996) became exemplary for linking social justice to questions of culture (voice and diversity in public spheres) and
questions of media (the need for inclusive media
infrastructures).
The influence of this exemplar was shown in December 1999 by the actions of a wide coalition of
protesters who met in Seattle to disrupt a World
Trade Organization (WTO) summit. Because
the Seattle protests originated a series of demonstrations against the dominant model of neoliberal globalization, the movement is sometimes
labelled the “anti-globalization movement,” but
they refused that label, as they were not opposed to globalization, but to specific economic
models that spread inequity worldwide. Learning from the EZLN, this movement insisted on
producing their own media rather than allowing
mainstream media to shape the narrative about

their actions. The Seattle protest organizers set
up the first Independent Media Center (Indymedia), and enabled protesters to produce and edit
their own coverage of the protests by uploading
to Indymedia’s web page which, in turn, incorporated Open Publishing software made available by media activist Matthew Arnison from
Sydney’s Community Activist Technology group
(Arnison 2001; Kidd 2004). This model was replicated during the first decade of the twenty-first
century in hundreds of cities worldwide under
the motto “Don’t hate the media, be the media”.
Even in a world of corporate-owned digital platforms, these visions from the Lacandon jungle
and Seattle still resonate through alternative
models of how social justice activists can appropriate and redesign media technologies to meet
their distinctive information and communication needs (Rodríguez 2001; in press).

7.2 Affordances and constraints: From the
mobile phone to social media and beyond
If the circumstances of the Zapatistas’ innovations were exceptional, broader changes in access to media technologies have been important
too. With the introduction of prepaid accounts,
low-cost handsets and relatively easy connectivity, mobile phone usage has spread across all
social groups, including poor and marginalized
populations. Despite stark inequalities in access, use, literacy, and resources (Donner 2015;
Qiu 2014), much social innovation and activism
with mobile phones has emerged, enabling collective action of all sorts, whether progressive or
not. At the same time, the migration of activism
to new digital platforms has encountered new
constraints. We must always remember that the
very same communication resources that benefit
movements for social justice and social progress

are also benefiting the movements that oppose
them, including forces of right-wing extremism
and authoritarian populism. Before discussing
activism in more detail, it is important to note
also that the affordances of mobile technologies
and social networking platforms enable new
kinds of everyday solidarity in contexts outside
of politics. The use of mobile phones, Internet,
and social media has been important among
migrants and their dispersed family, cultural,
and political networks (Fortunati, Pertierra, and
Vincent 2012). Filipino workers and other domestic workers (generally women) who spend
years away from their families and communities
use mobile phones and social media to maintain
bonds and connection with friends and families
(Madianou and Miller 2012). Chinese migrants
who leave rural areas to find work in cities (Chu
et al. 2012) also rely on mobile phones to create
a new “modern” identity, spanning urban and
rural settings (Wallis 2013). Outside the context of migration, diverse communities use mobile phones to redraw the boundaries between
the private and personal and create “intimate
publics” (Hjorth, King, and Kataoka 2014), for
example to mourn or grieve (Cann 2014; Cuminsky and Hjorth 2016). In the wake of the earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 11, 2011
social media and mobile phones provided new
channels for citizens to witness solidarity and
contribute to disaster responses in Japan (Hjorth
and Kim 2011).
One of the earliest places where uses of social
media and mobile phones entered politics was
Africa, where mobiles have been used for sharing information on health (SDG 3), “witnessing”
human rights violations (through the incorporation of cameras into mobile phones), and citizen
journalism, including election monitoring (Ekine 2010). An instructive case is Ushahidi (meaning “testimony” in Swahili), a mobile-based plat-
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form developed to share information and create
maps to report on postelection violence in Kenya
in 2008. In the South African elections of 2009,
political groups and their supporters used different kinds of mobile software, combining instant
messaging and chat functions to enhance communication (SDG 10). Labor struggles in Africa
have also adopted the Internet and especially the
mobile phone, alongside traditional media, for
purposes of mobilization, coordination, and solidarity, for example the Marikana mine workers
in South Africa (Walton 2014) and the El-Mahalla textile workers in Egypt. Section 5.4 discussed
parallel developments in Northeast Asia.
Another important affordance of ICTs for social
justice struggles is the ease with which they enable textual and multimedia commentary, protest, and dissent (SDG 16). Building on the early
history of dial-up Bulletin Board Systems (BBS)
from the late 1980s to late 1990s (Goggin and
McLelland 2016), the growth of the World Wide
Web in the 1990s saw the emergence of blogs as
a flexible and powerful architecture of connection and commentary (Bruns and Jacobs 2006).
In many countries, blogs enabled writers and activists, audiences and publics to engage and connect. Although this first attracted attention in
the United States, it quickly became influential
among social movements elsewhere, for example
in the Middle East, especially Egypt (el-Nawaway
and Khamis 2015) and Iran (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). Blogs provide a way for religious,
cultural, political, and linguistic communities to
connect across territorial boundaries around religion (the various Muslim blogospheres: Russell
and Echchaibi 2009), gender rights (Guta and
Karolak 2015), health issues, and diasporic and
sexual identities.
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But the implications of information and communications technologies for achieving social

justice and democracy are often ambiguous for
several reasons. First, patterns of access and use
remain very unequal. An example from the early
2000s comes from two postapartheid South African social movements, the Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC) and the Anti-Privatization
Forum (APF): although they used websites and
email to disseminate information, they needed
to limit their mobile phone use to communications within their organizations. The use more
recently of smartphones to communicate election messaging does not necessarily transform
the public sphere overall or citizens’ opportunities within it (Walton and Donner 2009). The use
of different media for different functions may
channel politics and related activity into particular elite domains (policy discussion by experts,
for instance), rather than broadly-based public
spheres in which wider populations can participate (Wasserman 2007).
Second, debate continues about the role of social
media platforms in creating new forms of solidarity and transnational mobilization. Facebook
has been associated with various social and political movements, especially the “Arab Spring”
uprisings of 2011, as well as the recent “Women’s
March” – a worldwide protest held in January
2017 to protect legislation and policies regarding
human rights and environmental issues. Meanwhile, Twitter - relatively simple in its design,
and without the cross-media integration of Facebook – has nonetheless helped incubate various
initiatives based on “hashtag publics” (Weller et
al. 2013), for example around Iran’s 2009 election
(Mottahedeh 2015), #BlackLivesMatter in the
United States and the #RhodesMustFall protests
in South Africa.
At the same time, however, the infrastructure
of social media and digital platforms remains
tightly controlled by their corporate owners and

managers (Andrejevic 2013), rather than by activists. Technological affordances that are key to
solidarity – for example the hashtag function in
Twitter – can be changed overnight by the parent
corporation without consultation or participation of users. It remains very difficult for users
or activists to have systematic input into the design and governance of commercial social media
platforms (Mansell 2012). Social movements and
social justice activists have learned that the potential of digital platforms to enhance their communication capabilities goes hand in hand with
increased surveillance of their actions (Treré
2015). Finally, it is important to remember that
the very same communication resources that
benefit movements for social justice and social
progress are also benefiting the movements that
oppose them. We need therefore in reviewing the
potential of new media technologies to acknowledge both affordances and constraints, and how
they interact in specific contexts.

7.3 One planet, many struggles, many media
Contemporary protest movements tend to draw
on an “enlarged media ecology” (Qiu 2008) of
old and new media, where traditional communication channels are mixed with new digital
tools of activism. A variety of media ecologies
have proved important in the context of different
struggles for social justice across the world.
The interplay among traditional and digital media reached new heights as the Arab uprisings of
2010 and 2011 spawned a vibrant scene of dissident media and culture. The rise of political
stand-up comedy was a hallmark of the uprising: in Bahrain, Syria, and Tunisia digital videos bore witness to atrocities, mocked dictators,
and showcased a variety of animation, dance,

theatre, and song. The media of artists and activists, often produced and disseminated under
extremely risky conditions, is an important form
of “creative insurgency” (Kraidy 2016). Meanwhile, media-based activism for gender equality
and the empowerment of all women and girls is
also growing worldwide. Through creative media
strategies, advocacy groups have from the 1990s
onwards made remarkable progress in the realm
of gender equality from universal suffrage for
women to rights for sexual minorities.
As another example, in the struggle against ISIS,
activists have been running clandestine festivals
of short films, shot on mobile phones, thereby
defying local political censorship and moral prohibitions. The group “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered
Silently” has documented the atrocities of daily
life under the Islamic State, propagating these on
social media and connecting with mainstream
journalists worldwide.
As these examples also illustrate, care is needed
to contextualize the role of digital platforms in
social movements. Digital technologies and social media platforms rarely drive political actions
and protest in themselves. Social movements’
communication strategies may involve not only
digital technologies but also a wide range of
nondigital media. In the 2013-2016 Gezi Square
protests in Turkey, solidarity was built through a
mix of media that combined photocopied zines
and street performance with content shared via
social media platforms (Saybaşılı 2014).
A significant new direction in media activism is
as a space for political agency outside the sectarianism that dominates mainstream media and
politics in polarized societies. In Lebanon, activists have mobilized around issues of environmental justice and the provision of utilities; the
2015 “You Stink” Movement, which used digital
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media to mobilize activism about inadequate
removal services for municipal waste, was a key
example of this trend.
Anticorruption campaigning has also harnessed
diverse media capabilities. The most dramatic example of using the Internet as an infrastructure
of connection to challenge not just corruption,
but state and corporate power more generally, is
the work of the activist group Anonymous with
its “denial of service” and other attacks (Coleman
2014) and the whistleblower platform WikiLeaks
(Brevini, Hintz and McCurdy 2013). One of the
largest civil society campaigns in recent years is
the 2011 Indian anticorruption movement triggered by Anna Hazare’s hunger strike in New
Delhi.
In conclusion, all social justice and social progress initiatives depend on complex media ecologies that offer resources while simultaneously
imposing risks and constraints. Activist individuals and communities, not technologies, drive
social progress, by meeting the specific communication and information needs of each social
justice context.

7.4. Creative affordances: The case of disability movements
An excellent case study of the role that the new
affordances of digital media technology can play
is disability. According to the landmark WHO
2011 World Report on Disability, more than one
billion people in the world experience disability
(15% of world’s population), of whom 110-190
million experience very significant disabilities
(SDG 3).
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Disability involves a wide range of impairment
types from sensory disabilities to cognitive dis-

abilities and psychosocial conditions. Prevalence
of disability is growing due to population ageing
and global increase in chronic health conditions.
Disability is highly correlated with disadvantage
but not “all people with disabilities are equally
disadvantaged” (WHO 2011).
A roadmap for putting disability at the heart of
the vision for social progress was proposed in
2006 by the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has
many provisions, which involve communication
and technology rights, since media is pivotal for
achieving human rights in relation to disability. People with disabilities generally experience
inferior access to and affordability of media infrastructures, technologies, content, and participation, especially in the Global South. At the
same time, disability becomes a paradigm case
for rethinking both media and media’s potential
contribution to social progress. Disability is a
key part of wider understandings of cultural and
media diversity, but is of particular interest because of disability struggles’ strong focus on digital technologies and their affordances.
Since the 1970s, the role of media in communicating negative attitudes, stereotypes and myths
about disability has been critiqued, commencing
with the role of advertising in “charity” discourses of disability and a push towards affirmative
images of disability. Although still very much in
the minority, people with disabilities appear as
characters of TV shows, increasingly reported in
news, or, on occasion, as media workers, broadcasters, journalists, and celebrities themselves.
However there remains a hierarchy of what is
newsworthy, entertaining, and shareable, even in
digital platforms. Mainstream media industries
generally lag behind in offering work opportunities to people with disabilities (SDG 8). Disability still occupies a marginal place on media

professionals’ agendas.
However, in various countries, people with disabilities and their allies are using digital platforms in distinctive ways: for example, U.S. Deaf
protests in the Gaudallet “Deaf President” campaign; the use of video, photography, and social
media by Bolivian disability activists in March
2016 to demand better social support (Goggin
2016); and British disability movement protests
from 2012 against welfare cuts, using blogs, Facebook, and Twitter. Through social media, blogs,
and websites a wide variety of disability publics
have emerged. People with disabilities have also
developed their own disability media: dedicated
blogs (Ouch! established by BBC in U.K.), disability comedy-chatshow news genres (The Last
Leg, Channel 4 in Britain), disability web-based
programs (Gimpgirl), and crowd-funding platforms used to fund investigative journalism or
entertainment.

implementation of the CRPD requires widespread accessibility, especially across design of
digital technologies, but national legislatures and
media corporations have been slow to act.
The lack of social progress on disability and media is a central issue for wider social progress. It
constrains the possibilities for social and cultural participation of people with disabilities (SPI
“Health and wellness”). Yet disability has much
to teach us about how communication occurs
across the world’s population: communication among, with, and by people with disabilities foregrounds issues of voice (Couldry 2010)
and listening (MacNamara 2015): people with
disabilities need access to public spheres where
we can all listen not least governments, corporations, civil society, and a wide range of other organizations and agents (Goggin 2009). Without
that the much-vaunted promises of new digital
technologies are hollow.

Issues of accessibility to media infrastructures,
as well as the potential affordances of these platforms, are particularly salient for people with
disabilities, for example, captioning on TV and
radio for the print handicapped. Despite their
long histories, disability media such as Braille
formats and sign language communication are
still given little recognition in wider society, although there have been concerted international
efforts on some aspects of digital technology (accessible computers and software, web accessibility, mobile phone accessibility, “apps” for people
with disabilities).
Yet even in areas with the most concentrated
effort, such as web accessibility, the situation remains inequitable: most government websites
across the world have low levels of accessibility
compliance, despite “digital first” government
service, welfare, and e-government policies. The
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8. Summary and recommendations
8.1 – This chapter has told two stories. On the
one hand, the vast and varied media landscape
we have depicted offers a complex set of resources for daily life and social movements. On the
other, this landscape is marked by processes of
power both old and radically new: new power
processes include an emerging logic of data extraction tied to an imperative of data stimulation
via increased message circulation (Sections 3
and 6). Through this transformation, unfamiliar
forms of domination and exclusion are emerging, while public discourse and practices of government are subject to surprising new pressures.
The long history of communications, and specifically media technologies, is now joining up with
capitalism’s development in striking new ways.
The resulting global information environment
requires urgent attention, if our understanding
of social progress’ dynamics is not to be dangerously oversimplified.

8.2 – Media are an important resource for movements that promote social progress, and effective
access to media is a necessary component of social justice (and a too-little recognized component of social progress itself). By “effective access”
we mean that all individuals and communities
should be able to use media infrastructures to
produce content, access information and knowledge, and be active participants in the realms of
politics, culture, and governance. Three major
factors complicate the picture considerably.
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First, the distribution of media resources (including traditional media and digital platforms)
is skewed towards the rich and powerful, and
away from the majority of the world’s population, especially poor, marginalized, and excluded
groups. This basic fact is ignored by the recurrent “social imaginary” (Taylor 2003) that sees

media infrastructures as automatically progressive and socially transformative (for critique, see
Herman, Hadlaw, and Swiss 2014; Mansell 2012;
Mosco 2004). Although people rely on media
platforms for connection and communication,
they generally have very little influence over their
design and pricing, or the conditions of access,
use, or content production and distribution. Second, there is not one single space of connection
enabled by media, but many such spaces, and the
relations between them are highly uneven: questions of language and culture, unequal influence
over Internet governance, software localization
and technical design, all make the Internet, in
particular, a highly uneven playing field for diverse groups, especially cultural and linguistic
minorities. Third, even with access and more
even distribution of opportunities for effective
use, it may not be solidarity and dialogue that
are facilitated when people come together via
media (online abuse is also on the rise): the Internet’s capacity, in principle, to enable multiple
producers of content is not therefore sufficient.
A central issue remains: how to design and sustain online spaces that encourage dialogue, free
speech, respectful cultural exchange, and action
for social progress? The governance of Internet
infrastructures is crucial in all of this, but itself
highly contested and uneven.

8.3 – In response to these challenges, we recommend that the key measure of “social progress”
in the global policy community (the SPI) be adjusted to recognize effective media access as a
new core component of social progress:

8.3.1 – While it is important that the SPI under “foundations of wellbeing” includes “access
to information and communications” (defined
in terms of numbers of Internet users, mobile

phone subscriptions, and a Press Freedom Index), this is insufficient: additional measures
are needed for the distribution of opportunities for effective access and use. Such measures
would concern not only access to the technological means to receive information and
content, but also to appropriate pertinent and
affordable technologies. The design of media
infrastructures and digital platforms needs to
be pertinent to diverse language communities,
individuals with different ability levels, learning styles, and financial resources.

8.3.2 – While it is important that the SPI under
“Opportunity” includes “personal rights” and
“tolerance and exclusion,” this is insufficient:
communication rights must be added to the
basket of personal rights, taking into account
the direct relation between lack of participation and diversity in the design and governance
of media infrastructures and lack of inclusion
and tolerance at a more general cultural level.

vatization and concentration in the media and
information industries should be reviewed by
regulators for its effects on the quality of media, its diversity, and its ability to meet people’s needs. The encouragement of subsidy and
spaces for nonprofit media should become an
essential component of struggles for social
progress and social justice. If progress is to
be made towards these wider goals, major efforts are needed by civil society, governments,
and international organizations to promote
and sustain media that exist outside of market
forces, and to secure noncommercial financial
models for their existence (e.g., license fees).

8.4.2 – Internet governance should not be in
the hands of organizations who make decisions, implement policy, and design online
architectures behind closed doors. Popular
participation and transparency should be the
guiding principles that frame Internet governance, policy, and regulatory frameworks.

8.3.3 – The right to privacy should also be add-

8.4.3 – Equally, processes for the design of

ed, including appropriate regulatory frameworks to protect against surveillance and data
extraction.

digital platforms and other means of accessing
the Internet should recognize and effectively
include representation from the full range of
human communities.

8.3.4 – In addition, references to “tolerance”
elsewhere in the SPI need to be interpreted to
include tolerance in the media (that is, the absence of hate speech against the LGBTIQ community, women and girls, ethnic minorities,
etc.)

8.4 – In addition, we make the following broader
recommendations:

8.4.1 – Media and communications infrastructures should be regarded as a common
good, in the same way as other infrastructures
(roads, railways, etc.). The recent wave of pri-

8.4.4 – Media infrastructures need to work
more effectively to facilitate the content creation by diverse communities. Access to media infrastructures as consumers, receivers or
audiences of content and information is not
enough; individuals and communities need
access as content creators; issues of language,
affordability, user competencies, and technology design are fundamental.

8.4.5 – Core aspects of society such as health
care, social services, and financial services will
be increasingly provided over the Internet in
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the future, access to digital systems needs to
be equally distributed among populations, and
such access should come free of commercial
tracking and surveillance.

8.4.6 – With increased state and corporate surveillance, censorship, and data gathering need
to become the focus of extensive civic debate
and regulatory attention.

8.4.7 – Sound, independent journalism, especially investigative journalism, is essential to
democratic life. Citizens need curated, credible, verified, and contextualized information
to be able to make reasonable decisions in
political, cultural, and social arenas. Alternative forms of funding investigative journalism
therefore need to compensate for the threat to
the commercial newspaper business model.

8.4.8 – Serious attention is needed also to the
impact on environmental sustainability of the
waste generated by today’s communication devices and the vast data-processing infrastructure that supports their use. This point has not
emerged earlier in this chapter, but it is an unintended long-term side-effect of intensified
connection through media (Maxwell and Miller 2012).

8.5 – In all these and many other respects media
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and communications flows and infrastructures
are not mere background to social struggles, but
themselves a site of struggle. We must acknowledge the overall lack of progress in media reform
over the past forty years. Since 1980 when the
NWICO’s MacBride Report was presented by
UNESCO, numerous initiatives have attempted to reform media infrastructures, including
the World Summit of the Information Society
(WSIS), the Free Press movement in the United
States, and the net neutrality and free software

international movements. However international organizations have not generally pursued
such concerns. The international organizations
responsible for proposing media policy (International Telecommunication Union (ITU); the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN)) have limited their scope to
technical matters discussed with little input from
civil society or social movements. A renewed
and more inclusive debate on media reform must
be launched.

Action plan
1. To add effective media access (as defined in
Section 8.2) as a new core component of social
progress in the SPI, to “ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable, and effective access to communication infrastructure,” while acknowledging the long-term environmental waste from
IT devices and data processing infrastructures.
This means positioning communication rights
as central to official definitions of Social Progress. Communication rights include the right
to be a content creator; the right to free expression; the right to knowledge and information;
and the right to privacy.
2. To open a public discussion in which matters
of inclusion, affordability, and diversity in media take center stage over markets and profit.
3. To pressure international and national regulatory bodies and policy-makers to design and
implement processes for civil society participation in Internet and media infrastructures
governance and policy. Media infrastructures
should be governed by multistakeholder,
transparent, and open bodies.
4. To pressure governments, the private sector,

and universities to be accountable for designing media platforms that are accessible to input from diverse individuals and communities
– especially marginalized communities such
as communities of color, gender minorities,
LGBTIQ communities, disabled communities,
and communities in the Global South.
5. To push for media and Internet regulation
that protects users from state and/or corporate
surveillance and data extraction for control or
marketing purposes.
6. To promote media and Internet regulatory regimes that forbid any type of censorship or discrimination based on disability, gender, sexual
orientation, or political, religious, or ethnic affiliations.
7. To promote the notion that “access” also includes opportunities for content creation and
not the mere technological access to platforms
for media consumption. Media and information literacy, technical competencies, linguistic
diversity, and capacity building are fundamental elements of access.
8. To re-establish independent, sound journalism as an essential element of democracy, and
for this purpose to explore alternative funding
models besides the commercial (innovative
forms of public-private partnership, license
fees, etc.).
9. To promote free access to software and free
knowledge, as the commons of humankind.
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Toolkit36

Goals/Values
Effective access
to communication
infrastructures

International
Policy Makers
Orgs

Corporate
media and
tech sector

NGOs

Citizens

Develop and
support citizens’ media
(produced by
Promote me- local comdia production munities for
Design media
and software local communities)
and digital plat- design proforms that can
grams in
Develop
be used by citi- schools
Develop regulazens to produce
and support
tion that allocates
Monitor media and disseminate Promote train- school media
a significant
and digital con- their own con- ing in media
proportion of
and informa- Implement
tent for diversity, tent
communication
tion literacy
citizen-run
inclusivity, and
resources (freAdopt net neu- and writing
media and
quencies, budgets, access
code
information
trality
R&D) to citizens’
literacy promedia initiatives Sanction corpograms
rate media and
Develop regulato- technology corDemand
ry systems to deal porations if they
tolerant,
fail to comply
in environmeninclusive,
tally friendly way
and diverse
with waste from
media and
IT products and
digital contheir use
tent from the
private and
Promote net neupublic media
trality in national
sectors
regulations
Develop regulatory regimes that
guarantee affordability, cultural
inclusion, and linguistic diversity of
media and digital
platforms

Promote the
notion that
“Effective
access to media
infrastructures”
includes using
technologies
to create and
disseminate
content

Produce tolerant, inclusive,
and diverse media and digital
content

Promote and
support citizens’ media

Defend net
neutrality
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Note: we have allocated the tasks in the toolkit matrix to the actor who should have the main responsibility for each
task, however various tasks should be developed by multistakeholder bodies

36

Transparency and
accountability of
media and digital
platforms

Incorporate
transparency and
accountability in
international and
national legislation/regulation on
media and Internet

Organize multistakeholder international and
regional forums
to discuss the
future of media
and digital platforms

Help subsidize
nonprofit media
and digital platforms

Communication
Rights:

Include communication rights
as a fundamental
human right in national legislations

Include communication rights
in SDGs, SPI,
and any other
similar global
blueprint to
assess progress,
wellbeing, and
sustainable development

Review and
adjust business
models for
consistency with
communications
rights

* right to be a content creator
* right to free expression
* right to knowledge and information
* right to privacy

Develop the necessary regulatory
frameworks for
the implementation, regulation,
and vigilance of
communication
rights

Mobilize
civil society
to participate
in global and
local discussion about the
future of media and digital
platforms

Raise awareness around
communication rights
among social
justice organizations and
Advocate poli- social movecies, regulations, ments
and treaties
that advance
communication
rights

Demand
inclusion and
voice in global and local
discussions
about the future of media
and digital
communication

Demand
communication rights
from national
governments,
the private
sector and
international
organizations

Produce and
disseminate content that informs
audiences about
communication
rights
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Participatory governance of media
infrastructures and
digital platforms

Design media and
digital platforms
regulatory regimes
that include effective civil society
participation,
and in particular
participation by
representatives of
Indigenous people
and people with
disabilities

Establish a global international
body responsible
for monitoring
and assessing
access, inclusion,
diversity, and
communication
rights in media
infrastructures
Promote the
notion that civil
society input is
essential in the
governance of
media and digital platforms
Implement
educational
programs for citizens about media and Internet
regulation and
governance
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Include civil
society participation in all
aspects of media
and Internet
governance
(e.g., ICANN,
WAN-Ifra)

Promote the
notion that
civil society
participation
in media and
Internet governance is a right
Implement
media and
Internet regulation and
governance

Demand
inclusion and
voice in global and local
discussions a
Demand the
opportunity
to participate
in media
and Internet
governance
Implement
citizen-run
educational
programs
about media
and Internet
regulation
and governance

Participation of
civil society in the
design of media
infrastructures and
digital platforms

Budget public
funds for inclusive
citizen-led research and design
of digital platforms
and software,
where “inclusive”
means including for example
women and girls,
indigenous communities, disabled
communities, and
linguistic minorities

Monitor and assess the cultural
appropriateness
and inclusivity
of media, digital
platforms, and
software for
diverse communities

Establish the
necessary channels to incorporate inclusive
citizen input
into research
and design of
communication
technologies,
especially IndigPromote inclu- enous commusive civil society nities, disabled
communities,
participation
and linguistic
and input in
the research
minorities
and design of
communication
technologies

Promote
research and
design of communication
technologies in
schools
Promote design of communication
technologies
and software
driven by
the needs of
disadvantaged
communities
and specifically (a) women
and girls (b)
Indigenous
peoples and
(c) disabled
people

Implement
inclusive citizen-run, local
initiatives of
communication technology research
and design
Demand
participation
in corporate
and public
communication technology research
and design
Promote the
use of open
access software

Develop and
fund initiatives
for sharing
knowledge,
know-how,
technical
expertise,
and content
between
disadvantaged
communities
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Protection from
surveillance and
data extraction

Media infrastructures and digital
platforms free from
censorship

Review and
adjust business
models for
consistency with
rights of privacy
and data protection

Promote a
public conversation on surveillance and
data extraction
as threats to
privacy

Re-position civil
society organizations as key
participants in
regulating the
Regulate the use
of algorithms for consequences of
marketing or sur- surveillance and
veillance purposes data extraction

Advocate policies, regulations,
and treaties that
advance rights of
privacy and data
protection

Expose unlawful government surveil- Demand
lance activities transparency
and accountSupport the
ability of data
design and dis- collection,
tribution of ad filtering and
blockers and the use of
tracker visual- predictive
algorithms
ization tools

Develop regulatory regimes that
demand transparency and accountability of content
filtering mechanisms
Develop legislation that protects
whistleblowers
and investigative
journalists
Include the social
responsibility of
media and digital
platforms as a key
element of international and national media and
Internet legislation
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Demand
the right to
privacy and
protection
against data
extraction by
corporate or
government
entities

Promote multistakeholder
regional and
international forums to address
surveillance and
data extraction

Design and implement regulation that protects
citizens from
surveillance and
data extraction by
media and Internet corporations,
governments, and
security organizations

Lead a public
conversation
about filtering
and predictive
algorithms

Develop transparent and
accessible
conventions
for disclosing
sponsorship, and
describing the
use of predictive
algorithms

Monitor the
transparency of
content filtering
mechanisms
used by corporate and government media and
digital platforms

Commit to
supporting independent investigative journalism as the social
responsibility of
media and digital platforms

Promote the
need for investigative journalism as an essential component
of democratic
life

Fund civil society initiatives
to monitor and
catalogue content removal
in digital
platforms and
social media
Support
independent
investigative
journalism
initiatives (in
universities,
foundations,
or government-sponsored organizations)

Demand
access to
knowledge
and information
Support
investigative
journalism as
an essential
element of
democratic
societies

Media and informa- Promote the
inclusion of media
tion literacy
and information
literacy as a core
element in educational curricula

In collaboration
with NGOs, civil
society, and citizens’ media, implement media
and information
literacy initiatives at the local
level, especially
targeting children and youth,
disabled communities, ethnic
minorities, and
other vulnerable
populations

Develop free
and accessible
media and information literacy
initiatives in
collaboration
with NGOs and
citizens

Linguistic
diversity

Coordinate and
support local
initiatives for
linguistic diversity

Produce content
in various languages, including Indigenous
languages

Implement policies that mandate
subtitles and
translation
Design regulatory regimes
that mandate the
production of
media content
and software for
linguistic minorities and disabled
communities
Include Indigenous people
and people with
disabilities in the
formulation of
media and Internet regulatory
regimes

Enable global
visibility of linguistic diversity

Develop local
initiatives of
media and
information
literacy –
linked e.g.,
to schools,
universities,
community
organizations, and
local citizens’
Promote pub- media
lic conversation about the
improvement
of media and
information
literacy
Fund/ sponsor media
and information literacy
initiatives
developed by
international
orgs, NGOs,
civil society
and citizens’
media

Promote
alliances and
collaboration
between media
and digital
communication NGOs
Design comand Indigemunication
nous NGOs
technologies
and social
and software
appropriate and movements
accessible to
diverse linguistic Mobilize
civil society
communities
and social
and disabled
movements
communities
to demand
linguistic plurality in media
infrastructures

Demand media content
available in
local languages
Demand media content
and digital
platforms
tailored to
disabled
communities
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Human knowledge as commons,
instead of commodities

68

Balance intellectual property rights
with notions of
information and
knowledge as
the commons of
humankind, and
the value of communication and
dialogue

Pressure trade
agreement
negotiations to
balance intellectual property
protections with
the rights to free
knowledge and
information
Promote free
culture and
free/libre/open
source software

Recognize the
limits to proprietary claims over
information,
expression, and
innovation
Acknowledge
the importance for social
progress of the
availability of
nonproprietary
information,
expression, and
innovation
Advocate policies, regulations,
and treaties that
advance a global
knowledge commons

Pressure
schools to
embrace free/
libre/open
source software in the
classroom

Demand
access to
knowledge
and information as a
right, not a
privilege
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